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Abstract

Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along
with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and
terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged
between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by
Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed
light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the
Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two
distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine
struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counterrevolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in
U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that
would have far-reaching and long-last effects.

v

Introduction
Sabotage
The mouth of Havana Harbor is guarded by three sentinels of Cuba’s Spanish colonial
past. For hundreds of years, ships entering the port have sailed slowly past El Morro, the
lighthouse-tipped stone fort that can be seen from all parts of the malecón seawall, one of the
most recognizable symbols of Havana’s romantic image. Across the bay sits the much smaller
and much older Castillo de Real Fuerza, the stone castle where the original founders of Cuba’s
capital first laid the foundation of the city. Situated beyond this, on the opposite bank of the sea
wall behind El Morro, sits La Cabaña Fortress, the largest and most imposing stone structure in
the Caribbean. Once a ship passes these guardians of the city, it enters the docks that empty
directly onto the narrow and winding streets of Old Havana, the heart of the city. Like so many
before it, on May 4, 1960, the French cargo ship La Coubre made its way past the forts and made
port at the Pan-American dock at the far corner of the harbor. Dock workers were in a particular
rush on this cool May afternoon because La Coubre was carrying extremely important cargo:
rifles and ammunition for the National Revolutionary Militias meant to defend the newly
triumphant Cuban Revolution against its internal and external counter-revolutionary enemies.1
The Cuban Revolution was little more than a year old and had been under political threat
from its neighbor, the United States, from the very beginning. Fulgencio Batista, the United
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Keith Bolender, Voices from the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism against Cuba (London: Pluto Press,
2010), p. 178-182.
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States’ strong-man in Cuba, was gone, as were the casinos and brothels of the old era. In their
place, the new Cuban Revolutionary Government and its supporters were attempting to build a
new Cuba, independent from Washington as well as the oligarchic rule of the sugar barons from
the past. Cuba’s political landscape was changing and a great battle of ideas had begun. The
Cuban polity was in a position where it would have to choose between a new political dynamic
and the so-called “politiqueria” of the past.2 In most cases the general Cuban public turned out
in support of the revolutionary initiatives rather than to aid the counter-revolutionaries. These
decisions would create a new Cuban identity born of popular defense of the new revolution
despite tension between Fidel Castro’s government and subsequent U.S. administrations.
There was a considerable amount of tension in the days following Batista’s flight
between Havana and Wall Street over the expanding nationalizations of U.S. business interests,
as well as the demands from Cuba’s young leaders for Washington to respect the island nation’s
sovereignty. For months, scattered groups of domestic counter-revolutionaries had been
sabotaging factory equipment and burning sugar cane fields in attempts to disrupt the Cuban
economy. Unmarked planes had strafed the industrial center of Havana just months before the
arrival of La Coubre. Moreover, dictator Rafael Trujillo, of the Dominican Republic, who had
recently taken in the ousted Batista, plotted to derail the Cuban Revolution, also with
Washington’s backing.3 In response, the Cuban Government formed armed citizens’ militias and
purchased arms to defend the Revolution.4 The counter-revolutionaries focused on the new arms
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Politiquería roughly translates to “politics as usual” in Cuban slang.
Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations in Cuba 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p.2031.
The Cuban Rebel Army was in the process of reorganizing and rearming after disbanding the former army of the
Batista dictatorship. Most of the equipment available to the Rebel Army and the National Revolutionary Militias
was left over from the former regime and included weapons left over from the armed struggle in the mountains.
During the period from 1959 until late 1960, there were almost no weapons purchased from abroad due to the
sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Cuba. Belgium was among the only nations (other than initial small amounts
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shipments coming into Cuba as viable targets. La Coubre was one in a long line of bombings to
take place in the first two years of the Cuban Revolution.
La Coubre sailed from Antwerp and made stops throughout the Atlantic, including a
short stop in Miami, before reaching Havana.5 Once docked, the workers quickly began
unloading the weapons. It was 3:00 pm and the streets of Old Havana were teeming with people
going about their business.6 Vendors sold their wares in the narrow alley-ways, children played
in the colonial courtyards, and the elderly sat and conversed in the Plaza de Armas as they
always have, and still do. All of that changed at 3:15 pm when an explosion on the deck of La
Coubre rocked the port. Citizens exited nearby buildings to see what was happening as dock
workers tried to reach the wounded. Government officials conducting a meeting a few miles
away rushed to the scene to assess the damage and provide assistance. Che Guevara and Fidel
Castro personally pulled a number of workers from the burning wreckage of trucks filled with
munitions. Thirty minutes later, a second and much more destructive explosion almost
completely destroyed the ship.7 The force of the blast was so strong that it shattered nearly ninety
percent of all of the windows in Old Havana.8 A cloud of ash and smoke filled the harbor and
choked the narrow streets of the old city. Elderly Cubans who lived in the city at the time
remember hearing the explosion and seeing the plume of smoke, even on the outskirts of the city.
Even today, the anniversary of the bombing of La Coubre is a day of remembrance of those
sold by the Soviet Union) to sell small arms to Cuba. This meant that Cuba had only restricted access to defensive
weapons at this time, whereas the counter-revolution received a steady flow of funding and weapons from
Washington. This would change in early 1961, when the Soviets became the single arms exporter to Cuba, allowing
the embattled Revolutionary Government to rearm and reorganize an effective defensive fighting force. Juan Carlos
Rodríguez, The Inevitable Battle: From the Bay of Pigs to Playa Girón (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2009),
p. 15-21.
5
Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations in Cuba 1959-62 (Sydney: Ocean Press, 2004), p. 4546.
6
The Docks are literally yards from the heart of the old city.
7
Interview with Juan Luís Rodríguez Infante, in Kieth Bolander, Voices From the Other side: An Oral History of
Terrorism Against Cuba (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 182-185.
8
Bolender, p.179.
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killed in terror attacks against Cuba.9 Rosario Olegario Velasco Gómez, a Cuban citizen whose
husband was killed in the explosion, sums up the general sentiment of many Cubans at the time,
during this and other counter-revolutionary attacks: “He was killed doing an honest day’s work
to help his fellow Cubans.”10 By the end of the day, more than seventy-three people, mostly dock
workers and ship crewmembers, were killed, and over 100 people sustained serious injuries.11
The day after the explosion, crowds well above the hundreds of thousands marched in a
funeral procession from the docks to the Colón Cemetery.12 At the entrance to the cemetery, at
the corner of 12th and 23rd Streets in Vedado, the more modern section of the city, the leaders of
the Cuban Revolution spoke to the angry and grief stricken crowds.13 Fidel Castro expressed
their anger and interpreted the series of events, beginning with the threats from the Eisenhower
and Nixon Administration, to the attacks on the Cuban economy and finally the bombing of La
Coubre, as a declaration of a not-so-secret, yet hidden, war between Washington and Havana,
and between the Revolution and the representatives of the former upper and middle classes that
saw their business interests threatened by the reforms enacted by the new government. Castro
called upon the crowd to remain vigilant, and to be prepared to fight for their cause. He reminded
9

Today there is a state sponsored organization called “The Association of the Victims of La Coubre” which helps
preserve the memory of those killed and wounded that day in 1960. They are represented in the large body of Cuban
popular organizations alongside those of the other organizations that promote the memory of other acts of terrorism
against Cuba, in particular, the bombing of Cubana Airline 455 in 1976.
10
Interview with Rosario Velasco, in Keith Bolender, Voices From the Other Side: An Oral History of Terrorism
Against Cuba. P.188-189.
11
In the following weeks, the authorities and independent international bodies launched investigations, all of which
concluded that an act of sabotage had been committed. Investigators attempted to recreate possible scenarios that
could have caused an accidental explosion on La Coubre. They went so far as to drop some of the boxes of
munitions from aircraft to see if they would explode on impact. This was meant to prove that the ammunition was
not fragile and would not likely have ignited just from the movement in the crates. Furthermore, investigators found
a great deal of evidence of sabotage, including the remains of pipe bombs. The evidence showed that not only were
these bombs set to explode, but that they were set to explode separately, a half-hour apart, the idea being to draw a
larger number of people to the scene with the first explosion, so that the casualties would be higher when the second
explosion occurred. The U.S. government denied any involvement, as did influential representatives of the émigré
community in Miami.
12
Havana’s largest cemetery.
13
Julio García Luis, The Cuban Revolution Reader: A Documentary History of Fidel Castro’s Revolution (Ocean
Press: Melbourne, 2008), p. 67-68.
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the crowd that the Cuba of 1960 was part of the “centennial generation,” a new generation
prepared to reclaim Cuba’s independence and defend it.14 Cuba today, he said, “was not Cuba of
the 1890s, or of the 1930s, but a new Cuba that would never attack its neighbors or threaten war,
but would defend itself to the last drop if its blood.” Castro reminded the public that the
revolution that was under attack was part of a longer lineage of struggle and was not only a
product of the contemporary period. He sought to remind supporters of the revolution that they
were repaying a century-old debt to history. Castro called for a “Struggle Against Bandits,” a
struggle against the secret forces of the Washington-backed counter-revolution who were setting
out to derail the Cuban Revolution.15
In Washington and in Miami, CIA station chiefs set up shop on the campus of the
University of Miami and recruited assets directly from the middle-class Cuban community and
the old ruling landowner class. They intended to form a secret army that could be used to
infiltrate Cuba and strike fear into the hearts of revolutionary supporters in an effort to
undermine popular support for Castro and the Revolution, which was at an all-time high. They
used every method available, from murder to terrorism.16 The Miami CIA station (JMWAVE)
was, for all intents and purposes, a very public recruiting center and anti-communist think tank.
Don Bohning, a former correspondent involved with the Miami Herald’s Latin America desk for
decades, has since composed an effective layout of the CIA apparatus in Miami at the time. He
claims that the CIA and its umbrella organizations were so far reaching in Miami, “that the
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The so-called “Centennial Generation” refers to the younger generation that not only had been the primary
vanguard against Batista, but represented the fulfilled idea of José Martí. It is in this idea that the Cuban Revolution
is descended directly from the wars of independence in the nineteenth century.
15
Fidel Castro, “Homeland or Death”, Havana, Cuba, May 5 1960, reproduced in The Cuban Revolution Reader, p.
68-71.
16
See Appendix A and B.
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general public though well aware of it only saw the tip of the iceberg.”17 By 1963, the JMWAVE
was the single largest CIA station outside the agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The
Miami operation was larger than that of Berlin at the height of the Cold War. The CIA knew
exactly who to recruit for its infiltration teams.
The members of these groups were concerned with their threatened business interests and
were steeped in the McCarthy-Era Red Scare. Many were of the middle class and felt betrayed
by Castro and the revolution because of the persistent hard line the revolution took regarding
U.S. industry on the island, nationalization, and rebel demands for national sovereignty. Many of
these men and women saw themselves as former supporters of the revolution (or at the very least
open-minded about it), who had not expected more than a simple change of politics, as usual, in
their favor. There had been political upheaval in Cuba for a century: what would have led them
to think that this time would be any different? It was these middle class men and women who
would fill the ranks of the counter-revolution. The battle between the Revolution and these
counter-revolutionary organizations is known in Cuba as the “Struggle Against Bandits.” Off the
island, this struggle has been relegated to nothing more than a footnote in U.S.-Cuban relations.
The Project: A New Synthesis
The “Struggle Against Bandits” itself was a series of confrontations, plots, and
counterplots that permeated the early years of the revolution, from 1959-1963, that took on the
attributes of both an ideological and intellectual confrontation and a very real physical
confrontation. Although the aggression against Cuba did not end in 1963, it was at this point that
U.S. policy was forced to change after the long string of defeats suffered at the hands of the
17

Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965 (Washington: Potomac
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Cubans. This thesis argues that this secretive struggle between the two intelligence communities
and ideological adversaries is of paramount importance in the half-century long history of
Cuba’s revolution and U.S. Cold War history. These counterrevolutionary clandestine groups
were consistently unsuccessful in derailing the revolutionary process and their defeats are central
to understanding the Cuban Cold War and U.S. policy shifts throughout Latin America. In many
ways, these organizations failed due to their lack of social and political legitimacy. Many of
these groups claimed to be independent organizations representing the Cuban Exile community
but were in fact structured from the ground up by the Central Intelligence Agency. Moreover, not
only did these organizations fail in their overall mission of assassinating Castro and derailing the
Cuban Revolution, they indirectly aided the Cuban government in consolidating the Revolution.
In most cases, following attacks on Cuban teachers, work places, and military targets, masses of
ordinary Cubans flocked to join revolutionary organizations. As Mrs. Velasco commented, most
of the victims were “just doing an honest day’s work.” The murder of teachers infuriated the
general public, the burning of cane fields angered the farmers who had just received them, and
workers were enraged at losing their jobs following the bombing and sabotage of factories. This
drove many into the revolutionary apparatus and towards resistance to external aggression.18
Cuba’s revolutionary process remains a polarizing and controversial point of contention
for historians. Though books and articles about the Revolution and its leaders are legion, many
aspects remain untouched in the overall historiography surrounding what is arguably Latin
America’s longest lasting revolutionary experiment. Since the triumph of the revolution in
January of 1959, Washington backed a powerful and active counter-revolution. This counterrevolution took concentrated and often violent action against the revolutionary process in Cuba
18

As will be examined later, many of the actions taken by the CIA sponsored counter-revolution included attacks on
teenage literacy volunteers during the 1961 campaign to end illiteracy on the island.
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and came to influence domestic U.S. politics and U.S. foreign policy in the region. The counterrevolution has historically been comprised of groups with differing political views. Some were
remnants of the deposed Batista regime; others were members of the upper and middle classes
who initially saw the Revolution as little more than a change of political leadership within a long
line of coups, or as an opportunity to insert themselves into positions of economic advantage.
What the organizations had in common was CIA patronage and ties to the U.S. Government.
Few of them understood or were able to predict the social aspect of Cuba’s revolution and felt
betrayed by its young, middle and upper-class leaders whom they viewed as class traitors.
Existing literature tends to view the counter-revolution as a monolithic body of CIA assets, or,
on the other end of the spectrum, as victims of a revolution that turned against them.19 What is
less analyzed is what interests they represented and why it was that they opposed the Revolution
and put themselves at the disposal of U.S. Cold War policy. The scholarly body of literature
lacks an analysis of the Cuban Revolutionary initiatives and campaigns against the counterrevolution, as well as the popular reforms that drew the majority of Cubans to the revolutionary
cause rather than away from it. The former oligarchs, military leaders, and even the middle
business-class opponents to the Revolution received huge amounts of monetary, logistical, and
military support from the U.S. State Department as well as the CIA. The odds were stacked
against the Revolutionaries. How was it that a revolutionary government in its infancy was able
to consolidate itself and defend against such an advanced network of clandestine intervention
19

Even well-meaning historians whose work deals with little-known aspects of the Cuban Revolution and its
relations with the United States suffer from a lack of analysis of the counter-revolution. Alex Von Tunzelmann’s
recent work, Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean is an interesting look at this period
across the Caribbean including in Haiti and the Dominican Republic but focuses almost totally on the personalities
of the leaders in each country. Stephen G. Rabe’s work in his two books Eisenhower and Latin America: The
Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America
rank among the best recent analyses of U.S. intervention in Latin America in this period but once again the narrative
centers on the halls of power in Washington and the major events of the period like the Bay of Pigs. Missing is an
in-depth look at the development of the counter-revolution itself and any analysis of Cuban resistance to it that
would add an important missing element to these works, the Cubans themselves.
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from its domestic opponents and their benefactors, the most powerful military nation in the
world? The reality is a fascinating and little understood story.
This thesis works on two levels. One is as an analysis of this marginalized series of
events which is vital to building a more accurate picture of the revolution, its opposition, and
U.S. strategy over the course of the Cold War. Rather than being complimentary to the Bay of
Pigs and the Missile Crisis, the “Struggle Against Bandits” was a crucial series of events that
encompassed both. Second, in examining the development of the clandestine struggle, historians
can more effectively contribute to the scholarship on the revolution’s longevity, and, what is
more, how the CIA’s use of the Cuban émigré community served as a testing ground for future
actions across the region over the course of the Cold War.
This project demonstrates Cuba’s resistance to the counter-revolution and how that
resistance triggered a change in U.S. policy. Before the Cuban Revolution occurred, the United
States supported the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and orchestrated the 1954
coup in Guatemala that ousted the country’s democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz.
These operations were totally successful from the CIA’s perspective, because they prevented
moderate nationalist movements from nationalizing resources. Even in the Congo, as late as
1960, the CIA supported the Belgian and Katangan forces against Patrice Lumumba. Cuba was
clearly meant to be another successful end to a popular movement. However, the trouble for the
CIA was that the Cubans succeeded in repelling every invasion and uncovering numerous plots.
Though sustaining a heavy loss of life and economic damages over the years of struggle, the
Cuban Revolution survived and is still standing. In response, the CIA and the counter-revolution
constantly changed tactics, and their strategy evolved over the years. As the United States
Government took a more interventionist role around the globe post 1963, particularly in the so9

called Third World, the rhetoric became that of “preventing another Cuba.” Cuba, the small
island nation, had forced the strongest intelligence community and the government that
supported it to constantly re-evaluate their courses of action. U.S. actions in Vietnam and SubSaharan Africa, as well as in the rest of Latin America, had their roots in the battles against the
Cuban Revolution.
Historiography
The diverse and extensive body of literature that exists across the political spectrum has
almost universally overlooked the importance of these secret battles. The average general history
of modern Cuba introduces the clandestine struggle between competing intelligence communities
as little more than a stepping stone in their overall narrative.20 Where many scholars fall short in
their analysis of these events is in how the “Struggle Against Bandits” is placed in context. The
conflict between Cuba’s new revolutionary government and its adversaries is almost always
framed solely through the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or both. These two
events marked flash-points of this secret war, but the battles, both armed and political, from 1959
until 1963 constituted a much more complex and often ignored series of events that represent a
sustained policy of aggression against Cuba on the part of the U.S. Government. Much of the
literature produced since the 1960s has concentrated on the opposition and the Revolution’s
responses as simply reactions to the radicalization of the Cuban political climate post 1959.21 In
other words, this is a “chicken or the egg” analysis (the U.S. encroached and the Cuban
20

Richard Gott’s Cuba: A New History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004,), p. 190-195. and Aviva
Chomsky’s A History of the Cuban Revolution (Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) are very good basic overviews of
modern Cuban history that are written largely as text books and barely mention a clandestine struggle. Both mention
very little activity before the Bay of Pigs.
21
Thomas G. Paterson attempts to analyze the relationship between the Cuban revolutionaries and Washington in
the days leading up to the Bay of Pigs but follows the fairly traditional pattern of American misunderstanding of
Cuba and of Castro’s steady radicalization and move towards the Soviet Union. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting
Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.
255-263.
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Revolution radicalized, or vice versa). Missing is an analysis of the reasons why most Cubans
turned out to combat the counter-revolution rather than join it. What is also missing from the
historiography of this period in Cuban history is an analysis of the repeated defeat of the efforts
against the Cuban Revolution that forced major changes upon the strategy of American policy
makers and had far-reaching effects on their conduct toward Cuba, Latin America and the
developing world in general for the rest of the twentieth century.
In the body of scholarly literature, a minuscule number of works focuses specifically on
the “Struggle Against the Bandits.” The most important of these is Jesús Arboleya’s The Cuban
Counter-Revolution.22 Arboleya, a Cuban historian, looks at the evolution of the Cuban
opposition on the island and its subsequent use as a CIA asset. Arboleya plots the trajectory of
these clandestine groups from spies to the textbook definition of terrorists in the employ of
Washington. More importantly, he analyses these groups as the most recent in the long history of
the Cuban business class, which has traditionally supported foreign intervention on behalf of its
own class interests, and opposed social restructuring in order to defend their leading role in
Cuban society and economics.23 In other words, he draws a line from the original sugar-planting
class and the early annexationists through the captains of industry in the first half of the twentieth
century, all the way to the Mafia and the Cold War. Arboleya’s book very clearly places the
counter-revolution in its proper context and accurately describes their patron-client relationship
with the CIA in a way that offers insight into their motivations. Arboleya and his work are
interesting in that they are representative of a body Cuban scholarship that is difficult to find

22
23

Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counter-Revolution,(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
Ibid., p. 1-10.
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published outside of Cuba or Latin America.24 They are representative of the scholarship that is
largely ignored by their counterparts in the U.S. and outside of the Americas.
Equally important is the work of Don Bohning, formerly of the Miami Herald. His book,
The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965, is a narrative history
from the internal perspective of the CIA and its Miami-based allies.25 The book centers on the
inner workings of the CIA at the time and its relationship with the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations. It is filled with declassified documents and first-hand accounts from former
operatives involved in offensive operations during the heyday of assassination attempts against
Castro as well as armed activity in the central zone of Cuba. This book exposes recently
discovered information on how the CIA organized itself and carried out Washington’s policy of
subversion of the Cuban Revolution. Though not overly sympathetic to the revolution, this book
does criticize the conduct of the U.S. Government’s secret war. Bohning’s book is filled with
personal interviews with agents who had remained silent for decades. Through his interviews,
Bohning was able to chart the evolution of the secret war against Cuba through the lens of
shifting political climates in Washington and Miami. Bohning’s work on the Miami side of the
conflict will be compared to and analyzed alongside the work of Fabian Escalante of Cuban
Intelligence.
Fabian Escalante was at the center of the events in question. While Bohning was a
journalist covering the secret war, Escalante was a participant, and is today one of the foremost

24

Due to the U.S. trade embargo and the infrequent granting of U.S. travel visas for Cuban scholars to visit the
United States, engagement is rare outside of international conferences outside of either country. The trade embargo
often prevents U.S. publishers and vendors from being able to obtain work by Cuban scholars.
25
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historians on the subject.26 Unlike his counterparts in the U.S., Escalante and those from within
the Cuban intelligence community are anything but quiet about events during this period. In his
three volume work beginning with The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations 1959-62,
Escalante provides the other counterpart to Bohning’s work. Escalante discussed measures taken
by the revolutionary government to remain abreast of external threats. Escalante’s trilogy focuses
on what are seen in Cuba as the three main aspects of the secret war. The first book deals with
the CIA’s generalized actions against the Cuban Revolution and Cuba’s responses.27 The second
volume centers specifically on what would become known by the CIA as Operation Mongoose,
which concentrated specifically on the assassination of Cuban leaders, Fidel Castro in
particular.28 Escalante’s final book puts forth the theory with evidence that the apparatus of
Operation Mongoose eventually tuned on its creators in 1963 with the assassination of President
Kennedy.29 Though this project does not deal directly with the Pandora’s Box of the Kennedy
assassination, this book is valuable in building an understanding of the complex and far-reaching
program of assassination.
Luis A. Pérez is a name that constantly presents itself in almost any study involving
Cuba, since his work is so often used as the most basic introduction to the history of Cuba since
the nineteenth century. For the purposes of this study, Pérez’s book, Cuba in the American
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Fabian Escalante was a student activist and political prisoner of Fulgencio Batista. Following his release after the
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Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos is well worth comment.30 Though centered well
before the era of the Cuban Revolution, Pérez goes to great lengths to describe how the United
States Government has seen Cuba since the time of Jefferson. Pérez describes a near psychosis
within the ranks of the U.S. Government, which was obsessed with dominating and exploiting
Cuba long before its Cold War obsession with assassinating Cuba’s leaders and destroying its
revolutionary experiment. In essence, Pérez asserts that the U.S. and its business interests reacted
strongly to the Cuba simply for its assertion of sovereignty, and would have done so during the
post-1959 period regardless of its leaders’ radicalization. Through the use of newspapers and
political cartoons, especially from the period just before the war of 1898, Pérez charts the
evolution of perceptions of Cuba from inside the U.S. It is with the help of Pérez that this project
is able to place Cuba’s struggle for sovereignty within the “long nineteenth century” rather than
simply confining it to the Cold War.
To supplement this, the work of Greg Grandin in his book Empire’s Workshop has
proved invaluable.31 Grandin places the Cuban counter-revolution within the greater scheme of
U.S. interventionism in Latin America. According to Grandin, the counter-revolutionary groups
both used and were used by Washington as both strove to reach their own political and social
goals. While many historians who focus primarily on the international relations aspect of this
period as well as scholars of the dynamics of “great power politics” gloss over U.S. actions in the
name of political realism, Grandin and, to a great degree, Stephen Rabe (mentioned earlier) both
place the U.S. in a long line of empires, and they are not swayed by post-Cold War
triumphalism. This small list of books makes up the majority of work dealing with the
30
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clandestine struggle as a complex series of waves rather than as a footnote to the “great power”
policies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They bolster this project’s objective of analyzing the
development of the “Struggle Against Bandits,” the defeat of the counter-revolution, and this
conflict’s role in shaping U.S. policy in the developing world in the following decades.
Methodology
In order to create a new synthesis it has been necessary in this project to bring together
these secondary sources that are part of an international scholarship that rarely meet. There are a
number of reasons for this. Though Cuba has a number of foreign language presses and there are
a few scholars who deal with the “Struggle Against Bandits,” these works are difficult to obtain
in the United States. On the opposite end of the spectrum, books by U.S.-based scholars with
access to declassified CIA materials, like Bohning, for example, are difficult to obtain in Cuba.
There are gaps that must be addressed in order to create a new synthesis on this topic. This is one
of the most important aspects of this thesis. Alongside these few select important works of
secondary literature, this project will make use of a number of never before used primary
sources. Among these sources are the communiqués and correspondence of the Comandos
Mambíses. This organization, in its day, was among the best funded and most successful of all of
the counter-revolutionary organizations based in Miami. Its members carried out a number of
actions and claimed to lack a political or economic motive other than eliminating the growing
socialist movement within Cuba. The Commandos claimed that they were self-organized and
self-funded in an attempt to create an aura of legitimacy in “reclaiming the revolution.” The
Commandos lacked popular support, as did most of the other organizations, and this, along with
faulty strategies forged in Washington, led directly to their defeat and disbanding by 1963. The
Commandos serve as an interesting and unknown microcosm of the entire clandestine war
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between the CIA-sponsored counter-revolution and the newly formed Cuban intelligence
services who, without training, were able to keep the CIA at bay.
Personal conversations with Cuban representatives who were present and took part in
these events inform the analysis. Dr. Manuel Yepe, of the University of Havana, graciously
agreed to converse about the evolution of the Cuban Revolution as well as Cuban attempts to
repel efforts by the CIA and the counter-revolution to derail it. Dr. Yepe is today a professor of
foreign affairs at the University of Havana. During the period in question, he went from being a
capable student revolutionary in the urban underground of the 26th of July Movement to head of
protocol for the new revolutionary government. Dr. Yepe has had a very unique career at the side
of some of the revolution’s leaders, and he participated actively in the changes taking place in
Cuban society at the time. These conversations with the author, conducted over the previous
three years in Havana, have been invaluable to this project. An extensive survey of the body of
literature on this period, the Comandos Mambíses papers, and the author’s lengthy conversations
with Dr. Yepe complement each other.
This work will be divided into three parts, each analyzing a different aspect of the
political and armed maneuverings that led directly to the state of Cuban-U.S. relations seen
throughout the Cold War, most of which continue today. Though the roots of these problems can
be found long before 1959, it was the period of 1959-63 that changed the power relations
between the two nations and had a profound impact on the Caribbean, Latin America, and the
Cold War in general. The revolutionary leadership and its Washington and Miami-based
adversaries were the key players in that development.
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The first section provides an overview of the revolutionary seizure of power, the
leadership, and the reforms enacted in the early days of the revolution, just after the 1959 victory
over Batista. No understanding of what developed later can be divorced from these reforms. Of
particular importance are the Agrarian and Urban Reform laws, the revolutionary tribunals, and
the formation of the National Revolutionary Militias (MNRs) and the Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). This section argues that the militias and CDRs were among
the main deciding factors in the outcome of the armed struggle against the CIA assets. A reading
of available Cuban Government documents addressing these reforms will provide a framework
for analysis of the larger ideological struggle that was taking place. A clear picture emerges from
these reforms that discards the myth of a population of victims and simple followers beholden to
Castro. What will be seen are the very real popular and grass-roots reforms that took place in
Cuba as well as how they drew ordinary Cubans into the struggle and gave them a stake in
defending the revolution. It was these men and women who would be the historiographically
unsung deciding factors in the defeat of the counter-revolution. Likewise, this section will
examine the beginnings of the battle between the economic interests of the U.S. and its émigré
allies, and those of the Cuban state. The reader will see the battle lines being drawn and be given
a window onto how a political and economic conflict became both an overt and covert conflict
that included sabotage, subversion, misinformation, intimidation, and sabotage.
The second portion of the project looks deeply into the actions and organization of the
counter-revolution from 1960 until its defeat at Playa Gíron (the Bay of Pigs Invasion). What
was going on in the upper echelons of Cuban society when the revolution took power, and what
actions did they take to retain control of their assets? Where did the CIA stand in the final days
before 1959? At what point did the CIA and the opposition begin to take action against the
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reforms? It is here that we will first be introduced to Rafael Martínez Pupo, who was
representative of the supporters of the counter-revolution. It was Martínez who would come to be
the founder of the Comandos Mambíses, and it is through this organization that we will see the
shift in counter-revolutionary strategy from what is called the “controlled period” of CIA activity
(1959 until mid-1960), to invasion in early 1961, and eventually on to what is known as the
“autonomous operational period” which lasted until November of 1963.
The third section analyses the period of “autonomous action” leading up until the end of
the 1962 October Missile Crisis. The activities of the Commandos will be analyzed to understand
how they were representative of the changing tide of CIA activity. This section will conclude
with the final defeat of the last counter-revolutionary bands in central Cuba as well as the
removal of funding from the majority of organizations bringing the “Struggle Against Bandits”
to a close in 1963. This section of the study discusses the beginning of the Johnson
Administration and what this meant for the anti-Castro movements.
The project will conclude with an overall review of the “Struggle Against Bandits” and
how the resistance of ordinary Cubans changed the face of U.S. interventionist policy. The trends
and strategies of clandestine U.S. operations in the Third World, within the context of the post1959 Cold War, were first formulated to combat Cuba’s Revolution. Interestingly, the same
personalities involved in the actions against Cuba continued to make their presences felt time and
again, especially later in U.S. policy, and in terrorist activity in Cuba and the United States. Cuba
has legitimately battled against the ongoing threat of terrorism and had been doing so long before
the “War on Terror,” with all of its connotations, entered the global mindset post 9/11/ 2001. It
seems that the more independent Cuba fought to become, the less rationally its large neighbor
has reacted to it. The more independence Cuba asserts for itself politically, the less
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independently U.S. foreign policy is carried out as the elders of the counter-revolution still hold a
monopoly on popular discourse in the U.S. regarding Cuba. Miami gradually acquired its own
foreign policy which continues to operate even today. All of these competing dynamics can be
linked to the dramatic and often overlooked “Struggle Against Bandits.”
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Chapter 1

From the Sierra Maestra to Power: the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution

All Eyes Were On Us

“On January 1, 1959, many people thought they had stepped into a world of
riches. What they had really done was to win the opportunity to start creating- in
the midst of underdevelopment, poverty, ignorance and misery- the wealth and
well-being of the future.”32
Fidel Castro

Sitting in a bright living room in Havana’s tree-lined Vedado neighborhood, a
revolutionary remembered where he was on January 1st 1959 in a conversation over coffee. The
years had done nothing to fog his memories of the most important events of his life. “Everything
was happening faster than we expected,” he said. Santa Clara had just fallen to Column 8, and
the Rebel Army was already on its way from Las Villas through Matanzas and then on to the
capital.33 He remembers that, “once we heard over Radio Rebelde the call for the general strike,
we took to the streets.”34 It was the first time the student revolutionaries were able to openly
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Fidel Castro, quoted in Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1969), p. 1.
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Santa Clara is the third largest city in Cuba and was the setting of the final major battle of the armed struggle to
overthrow the Batista dictatorship. Column 8 was the armed guerilla unit under the command of Che Guevara that
captured the city.
34
When the news that Batista had fled the island in the early morning hours of New Year’s Day 1959, Fidel Castro
and the rebel leadership issued the call for a massive and long awaited general strike that would bring the nation to a
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carry their weapons and wear their 26th of July armbands on the streets. It was New Year’s Day
1959, and Mr. Yepe was only a young student. Where most young people his age in other parts
of the world would be finishing their studies, his generation had the revolution. “That was my
university experience. It is what we had fought so hard to create.” The next morning Yepe
received a call from the advancing rebel column at the general post office where he had stationed
himself. The raspy voice on the other end asked if everything was going well where he was and
told him that there were nearly a thousand government troops wanting to surrender just outside
of town. “He told me that I was the most senior man on site, so it was me that had to negotiate
the surrender. I only had a handful of people. How were we, just college kids with some light
arms who had no experience in politics going to negotiate the surrender of uniformed soldiers
who were just hours before, out to kill us?” There was no one else and the persistent, raspy
voice was ordering Yepe to take charge.35 Though they would later become close friends and
colleagues, that was his first introduction to Comandante Che Guevara, and for both of them, this
day was a transformative one.36
This was a watershed moment in Cuban history. For the first time, a militant generation
of young Cubans had overthrown a corrupt government by force of arms and were triumphantly
entering the capital. For the first time, a revolutionary movement was taking power, not being
co-opted and or driven back by military coup. It was Che Guevara, a young man of thirty at the

halt and prevent a coup during the power vacuum. The strike mobilized all sectors of the revolutionary underground
in the cities and prevented a second seizure of power on the part of the military.
35
Dr. Manuel Yepe had been a member of the 26 th of July Movement’s underground in Havana. After having his
cover blown in late 1958 he was sent to Matanzas City about three hours east of Havana on Cuba’s northern coast.
There he was in charge of organizing a new clandestine cell and was there on January 1 st 1959. After the
mobilization and capture of the key points in the city, he was ordered by Che Guevara, whose column was
approaching on the central highway, ordered Yepe to take some of his fellow activists and negotiate the surrender of
the large contingent of government troops stationed outside the city. After doing this he returned to Havana during
the rebel entrance into the capital.
36
Dr. Manuel Yepe, Notes from conversation with author, Havana Cuba. July 2012.
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time, who may have articulated it best when he said that at that moment, “we represented the
hopes and dreams of an unredeemed America. The eyes of the oppressors and those of the
oppressed were fixed on us.”37 What he meant was that the revolutionary victory was unexpected
for many, and that there was a new responsibility placed upon the shoulders of the Cuban
revolutionaries. They had done something that had not been done before in Cuba or for much of
Latin American history. It was their responsibility to carry the revolution forward and defend it.
Crowds lined both sides of Havana’s malecón. It was January 8th 1959, a week after
Batista’s flight, and Havana had only recently been secured by the rebel army columns.38 This
was the day in which the so-called “Freedom Caravan” of the main body of the Rebel Army was
finally entering Havana with Fidel Castro, the rebel hero of the younger generation, at its head.
Castro was welcomed by the largest crowds Havana had ever seen. The changes promised by the
rebel leadership were lightning fast in their inception. Within days Cuba was changing,
confirming the idea that this was a “real revolution.” This was not simply a change of political
leaders, but the beginning of important structural changes that would shift the political climate
from one of gangsterism to something new. Over the course of the week it took Castro to march
to the capital in the victory caravan, he spoke to multitudes in every municipality. Again and
again he told the crowds that this was not 1898, it was not 1933, and that there would be no
going backwards to politiquería.39
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Ernesto Che Guevara, Remanisances of the Cuban Revolutionary War (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2006), p273274.
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On January 1st the columns of the rebel army under the command of Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos entered
the city while members of the revolutionary underground rose up with the general strike to take key parts of the
capital. Guevara and Column 8 took command of La Cabaña Fortress, and Camilo Cienfuegos’s unit took command
of Camp Colombia, the largest military base in Cuba which is just outside of the city.
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In 1898 the rebels who had been fighting for decades to free Cuba from Spanish colonialism were subverted by
the invasion of the United States military which led directly to the semi-colonial status that Cuba was subjected to in
the twentieth century. Castro’s reference to 1933 is based upon the popular protests that ended the presidency of
political strongman Gerardo Machado but was subverted by the ambitions of Batista, with U.S. backing.
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Within twenty one months the revolutionary government instituted earthshaking reforms
that not only changed the political landscape of Cuba but made immediate enemies in both
Washington and on Wall Street. The most important of these reforms charted a course for the
Cuban Revolution that would be seen as irreconcilable with U.S. strategic interests and the
economic status of the island’s elites. It would be these forces that would mobilize themselves to
first take economic action against the new government, and eventually try to destroy it. The
reforms included tribunals for the most violent and repressive officers and representatives of the
former regime, a move toward universal housing, a renegotiation of foreign relations, and,
arguably most importantly, land reform. The process put in motion would lead to the
strengthening of revolutionary resolve on the island and create the conditions for the “Struggle
against Bandits.” The distinct battle lines were drawn very early. What were these far reaching
reforms enacted by the young government that would compel counter-revolution and its backers
in Washington to take action so soon after the triumph of a popular revolutionary movement?
Revolutionary Justice
In the first months after Batista’s flight, rebels and citizens began to arrest the most
highly accused of the former regime’s henchmen. They were high-ranking military officers
accused of war crimes, police officers accused of torture and repression, and government
officials accused of embezzling public funds. The prisoners were held in the Cabaña Fortress and
in other municipal garrisons across the island as evidence was gathered and their victims and
families of victims sent for. Throughout the first half of 1959, the trials were massive events
drawing hundreds of thousands and prompting demonstrations of millions in support of the
tribunals. Immediately condemned in the United States as “show trials” due to the fact that some
of the most important proceedings were open to the public and televised, these trials were a
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political necessity for the new government.40 The crimes of the Batista years were many in
number and there was a massive public outcry for justice. Justice itself was one of the pillars of
the political platform of the 26th of July Movement. From the earliest days in the Sierra Maestra,
Castro had promised the public that the political gangsters of the Batista regime would have to
answer for their crimes. Witnesses, victims, and the families of victims were allowed to face the
defendants and accuse them directly. Defendants were by most accounts well treated and allowed
defense counsel and witnesses in their favor as most criminal trials in much of the world would
call for.41
Though condemned in the United States, these trials met with massive public approval in
Cuba, and when the Eisenhower Administration issued criticisms of the trials, crowds of up to
one million took to the streets outside the U.S. embassy in Havana to demonstrate in favor of the
tribunals. Historian Michelle Chase, in her recent essay on the tribunals, asserts that these trials
have often been used to demonstrate the consolidation of power on the part of the Revolutionary
Government; little is said of the legitimacy of these trials in the body of literature.42 The
proceedings served to highlight the crimes of the Batistanos and juxtapose them with the fair
treatment of prisoners at the hands of the rebels both during and after the armed struggle. There
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was a strict policy in the conduct of the armed struggle against Batista that there would be no
torture of captured solders. This was a policy that was continued beyond the victory of the armed
struggle and has been maintained in Cuba. Also important to discuss is that following moments
of upheaval, Cuba had a history of mob violence. Dr. Manuel Yepe of the University of Havana
points out that Cubans remembered the 1930s, where following the ousting of the dictatorship of
Gerardo Machado, there was no attempt by the new government to bring justice against the old
regime in an orderly fashion. Angry mobs roamed the streets attacking the criminals of the
Machado administration, and many were killed.43 According to Yepe, if the revolutionary
tribunals proved anything, it was that the 26th of July Movement of 1959 was very much
concerned with not only justice, but maintaining public order. According to Yepe, the rebels
wanted to prove to the people that they would bring the gangsters to justice, but they did not
want to revert to mob violence. In their revolution there would be no lynching.44 Revolutionary
justice was, in this analysis, swift and resolute, but fair, without excess bloodshed. In essence,
the tribunals served multiple purposes. They were an almost cathartic way for Cuban society to
exorcize the demons of the Batista regime and begin anew. Likewise, they effectively held back
the tidal wave of mob violence that could have taken place had there been no trials, as had
occurred in the past.45 From the perspective of the new government, the people would have taken
justice into their own hands, and it was the duty and responsibility of the new government to do
this in a responsible way. The political importance of the executions of those convicted of torture
and murder proved to the population that justice would come and that there was no going back.46
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Beyond this, the tribunals were also a unique form of popular participation in the revolution
itself. The leadership called upon the public to face their former oppressors and in making the
proceedings accessible to the public, there was a sense of participation in the process of justice
rather than the new state exacting justice behind closed doors. The tribunals brought closure and
utilized violence sparingly despite the American propaganda of the day which continues to play a
decisive role in how Cuba is portrayed to the American public to this day.47
In the halls of power in Washington, these trials did not bode well. Many of
Washington’s former intelligence assets were on trial, and the general consensus on Wall Street
was that these feisty young rebel leaders lacked respect for previous arrangements fostered over
a long history of close relationship between the U.S. business class and friendly regimes in
Havana.48 For many in the Cuban upper-classes, as well as those who had a colder attitude
toward the revolution, these trials were a very real threat to their existence. Members of the
conservative middle class who were simply expecting a change of political leadership rather than
very real exacting of justice upon the old order rejected the trials as showpieces of repression and
portrayed them as a near holocaust.49 This notion overlooked the very real crimes that had been
committed at the hands of Batista’s forces. Political activists had been tortured and murdered in
the cities by police and organized criminal elements with links to the government, and army
officers had been responsible for the murder of peasants, rebel prisoners, and the forced
47
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relocation of farmers. Homes in the countryside had been burned, and the list of crimes during
the Batista regime was long.
In a very real sense, these tribunals were an opening salvo for the political and physical
battles to come. Many who escaped before being sent to trial moved directly to Miami and
incorporated themselves into a growing community of middle-and upper-class Cuban citizens
who would leave Cuba until what they saw as a short-lived revolutionary process came to an
end. Arguably the greatest byproduct of the tribunals outside of Cuba, where they were met with
support, was mythmaking. The number of executions has been the subject of great debate since
the trials themselves. For critics of the revolutionary government, the numbers of executions run
well into the thousands. Much of the popular image of these trials in the U.S. are of them being
extrajudicial in nature and little more than a way for the new government to eliminate enemies. 50
Though the trials played a role in the consolidation of the rebels’ power, there was never
anything secret about the tribunals. Fidel Castro and the rest of the revolutionary leadership from
the very beginning presented the trials openly and rejected all criticisms of them from outside
Cuba. For supporters of the revolution, the criticisms from Washington and Miami were
irrelevant as they were infringing upon Cuban sovereignty. The real numbers of executions and
prison sentences are in reality, comparatively much lower than those of other revolutionary
seizures of power. The public was called upon to help the rebel army round up war criminals,
and within the first few weeks after January 1, 1959, nearly 6,000 prisoners were being held in
garrisons across the island, around 600 of which were held at the Cabaña.51 By the end of the
tribunals, nearly 600 people had been convicted of crimes and executed. A number of others
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received long prison terms. What is regularly forgotten outside of Cuba is that a great deal more
were found not guilty and released to rejoin society or were free to leave.52
Finally, for the new government, the revolutionary tribunals were necessary, from the
standpoint of defensive strategy. Revolutionary leaders like Castro and Guevara had witnessed
reform movements and rebellions meet their goals only to be subverted and destroyed for not
bringing violent counter-revolutionaries to justice, or because they did not create the apparatuses
to ensure the defense of their respective governments. A perfect example of this was the 1954
overthrow of reformis president Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala.53 Guevara was in Guatemala
during the coup against Arbenz and had seen firsthand what could happen if a revolution was
unprepared to defend itself. The revolutionary tribunals were seen as a necessity in not only
bringing Batistano war criminals to justice, but in neutralizing those most likely to attempt to
reverse the revolution. Though far from the absolute bloodbath of counter-revolutionary claims,
the opening shots of a new struggle had been fired, and the new Cuban government began to face
opposition from both the U.S. government and their contacts in the émigré community in Miami.
Agrarian and Urban Reform
Arguably the most important reform enacted by the revolutionary government in its first
year in power, if not in the entirety of the revolutionary process up until the present, was the
Agrarian Reform Law signed into action on May 17th 1959 at the former guerilla headquarters in
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the Sierra Maestra at La Plata.54 The signing of the reform in the mountains was symbolic of the
fulfillment of the first promise of the Rebel Army which was to ensure that Cuba’s lands would
be returned to those who had worked them for so long. For campesinos this moment was the
culmination of a long struggle, and for idealists who looked to Cuba’s past of foreign domination
it was a true milestone in Cuban history. The agrarian reform served not only to solidify support
for the revolution among farmers, it was also a supreme act of defiance toward foreign business
interests and a reaffirmation of Cuba’s national sovereignty.
Historically, Cuba’s farmland was owned almost in its totality by foreign entities whether
Spanish colonial authorities, the planter class, or American multinational corporations like the
United Fruit Company. From the perspective of Cuban revolutionaries, Cuba’s peasants had
never been allowed to work their own land for their own people because it was always done for
the benefit of outsiders. Before the agrarian reform a tiny minority of landowners possessed the
majority of Cuba’s arable land. In the vast majority of cases, these massive landholdings were
owned by Cuban sugar barons and planters who either owned the land as wealthy families or as
middlemen to foreign firms.55 The majority of the prime farmlands were owned by U.S.
companies, United Fruit being the largest and wealthiest.56 Sugar production was the main
emphasis of the economy in Cuba at the time, and massive fortunes were made from the Cuban
sugar quota which was sold almost exclusively to the U.S. market.
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The lives of farmers and agrarian laborers before 1959 ranked among the most difficult in
the country. Like their counterparts all over the Americas, in most cases they did not own the
land on which they lived and worked. The land upon which their very subsistence often
depended was normally owned by absentee corporations (American and Spanish in the case of
Cuba), or wealthy Cuban conglomerate managers. Many of Cuba’s campesinos were
sharecroppers (more than 150,000), and over 200,000 were were totally landless and worked
either as migrant labor or remained unemployed until harvest season which elevated the rural
unemployment rate to extremely high levels.57 The 1940s and 50s in Cuba are regularly
romanticized as a jazz infused, glamorous period. Havana was a bustling metropolis that was the
envy of Latin America, and the national economy enjoyed stellar growth. 58 These things were
and continue to be emphasized by critics of the Cuban Revolution, but they overlook the reality
of daily life for the majority of Cuba’s population, particularly in the rural areas of the country,
as Cuban economic development primarily benefited the urban upper classes.59
The initial agrarian reform law limited land holdings to 402 hectares. It immediately
made farmers and sharecroppers of small and medium size the owners of the land they worked,
and this went for the landless peasants and day laborers as well. Large landholdings were divided
up and distributed free of rent payments or purchases. This redistribution of land was met with
widespread support from poor farmers and almost total condemnation from the planter class and
the U.S. companies. INRA, or the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, was created to manage
the redistribution of land, and it sent trained agronomists to the countryside in an attempt to
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better instruct the former day laborers and sharecroppers how to gain better crop yields.60
Sharecroppers and migrant laborers were encouraged to form cooperatives to increase
productivity and technical knowledge.61
Though the purposes of this study are not to describe at length the inner workings of the
INRA, or the crop yields and sugar production, it must be emphasized that INRA and the reform
in general solidified support for the revolution in the farming communities.62 How does it play
into the greater theme of counter-revolution and responses on the part of the revolutionary
government? The Agrarian Reform was the second break with the past that the Cuban
Revolution undertook. The initial land expropriations were carried through with compensation in
the form of long-term bonds for the absentee and local owners of massive agricultural holdings.
This infuriated United Fruit’s board of directors as well the domestic Cuban planter class who
rejected the distribution of land as well as the offers of compensation. Criticisms of the Agrarian
Reform Law were just as swift as those leveled at the revolutionary tribunals. Castro and his
government were, according to U.S. companies, showing a blatant disregard for what they saw as
their property.63 In essence, the rebel government’s reply was simply that the land was the
physical representation of Cuba in its purest sense, and that land should belong to its people. This
very nationalist sentiment was tantamount to heresy in Latin America at this time from the
perspective of the U.S. government and business interests. In 1954, reactionary elements
overthrew the Arbenz government in Guatemala for a less radical proposal of agrarian reform.
Agrarian reform, regardless of how radical or moderate, was seen as a declaration of war by the
oligarchies that ruled most of the Americas, and Cuba was no different in this regard. Within
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weeks of the reform being enacted, there were calls out of Wall Street and their Cuban business
partners for action.64 Initial urban reforms were met with similar support from a broad portion of
the Cuban public.65 By mid-1959, the rents of city dwellers were slashed in half and the amount
of urban real-estate that one could own was reduced, effectively breaking the monopoly that a
select few held on urban housing.66 Thousands of Cubans, who had been renting for decades,
received deeds to the locations in which they were currently living, effectively doubling Cuba’s
home ownership rates by the end of 1960. The Urban Reform took place in stages that lasted
until 1965, but it was the initial wave of mandated rent reductions and property nationalizations
that first frustrated landlords and urban industrialists, many of whom emigrated and joined
counter-revolutionary organizations.67
The agrarian and urban reforms would soon be accompanied by other extremely popular
structural changes such as the adoption of universal healthcare and education for all Cubans.
These reforms, based on ideas of social justice, not only provided the majority of Cuban society
with access to services they had never received before, they also inspired an ever increasing
sense of loyalty toward the process on the part of working-class Cubans, especially within the
Afro-Cuban population who had been living under Jim Crow conditions.68 This being said, with
each radical reform, more and more of the conservative members of the middle class began to
leave Cuba and join their wealthy counterparts in Miami. The rhetoric of the revolutionary
government strengthened their fears, and their own rhetoric increased its reactionary tone. Critics
of the Cuban Revolution and political adversaries of the process today almost constantly look
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back at these reforms through the lens “what the revolution took from people.” More often than
not, especially within the United States, the revolutionary reforms are typically seen as an almost
random and malicious theft of “private property” with little cause and recourse. This choice of
lenses through which to view these events is one factor that helped lead to the political
confrontation that came to a head by early 1960. It would also help motivate reactionaries to try
and subvert the revolution which was, after these reforms, at the height if its popularity. What
many often fail to see, or refuse to recognize, is that the majority of Cuban citizens at that point
in time, rather than having things taken from them, actually received benefits from the
revolution.69 Peasants received deeds to land of their own for the first time. People’s rent was
slashed if not eliminated as housing became a right guaranteed by the state. Wages were raised
for many. Access to education, healthcare, sport and culture would help create a new Cuban
identity that was based on resistance to aggression, and gave ordinary Cubans a stake in the
revolution. These reforms helped create a society conscious of itself and ready to defend the
gains it had made up to that point.
Battle Lines Drawn
The trials and reforms were watched very closely in Washington. Just weeks after the
revolutionary victory, Fidel Castro traveled to the United States on a public relations visit. Castro
sought to meet with President Eisenhower to renegotiate Cuba’s relationship with the United
States, and to attempt to create an atmosphere of respectful understanding between the two
leaders. Insults to Castro and the Revolutionary Government were quick in coming. Eisenhower
went out for a round of golf rather than meeting with the young revolutionary, instead leaving
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the rendezvous to his Vice President Richard Nixon.70 Nixon met with Castro for an hour. After
the meeting, Nixon informed Eisenhower and his presidential advisors that Castro was dangerous
and needed to be overthrown.71 From that moment forward, plans were drawn on Eisenhower
and Nixon’s orders to overthrow Castro and derail the Cuban Revolution. The CIA set to work
straight away.
By 1960, in the wake of the Agrarian Reform Law and the revolutionary trials,
Washington had lost patience with the disobedient new leaders in Cuba and began to issue
warning that Cuba’s continued disregard for American property would have consequences.72
What followed was a political “tic-tac-toe game” between the two governments that would result
in the U.S. government recruiting Cuban counter-revolutionaries to take violent action in Cuba
against the revolution and fight a clandestine war between the two nations.73 As relations began
to sour, Anastas Mikoyan, special envoy of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began to meet
with members of the Revolutionary Government in an attempt to establish diplomatic relations
and trade agreements.74 Initially, the Soviet government offered crude oil for prices lower than
what the Cubans were used to paying the United States from where they imported all of their oil.
In an attempt to break Washington’s monopoly on Cuba’s industry, Castro accepted the oil at
reduced prices and in exchange for selling reduced price sugar to the Soviet Union, whose sugar
consumption has historically rivaled that of the United States.75 This struck a soft spot with
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Washington as not only were the Cubans now openly trading with their ideological enemy the
Soviet Union, but they were losing their monopoly on Cuban oil consumption. The Eisenhower
administration had one other political card left to play. All of the oil refineries in Cuba were
owned by U.S. corporations.76
As Soviet crude oil began to arrive in Cuba, the managers at the U.S.-owned refineries
refused to process the Russian oil. This was naturally met with anger on the part of the Cuban
government as it demonstrated blatant disrespect towards a sovereign nation and what it could
and could not do with industry on its own soil. The revolutionary government’s response was to
nationalize the U.S. oil refineries in Cuba.77 This enraged Washington and Wall Street as they
lost their valuable refineries, and their Cold War adversary was now trading openly with their
neighbor. Though this was Cuba’s right as a sovereign nation, this moment harkens back to an
earlier time, that of the Platt Amendment, when regardless of what transpired, Washington
demanded a say in Cuba’s political and economic conduct.78 In response to the nationalization of
the oil refineries in Cuba, the Eisenhower Administration cut off the Cuban sugar quota.79 The
quota was the lifeblood of the Cuban economy. Since 1898, the Unites States had purchased
nearly ninety percent of Cuba’s annual sugar exports. Without that transaction, the Cuban
government was placed in a difficult position as it was no longer making the revenue it needed to
continue with its reforms and social programs, not to mention the day-to-day economic
functioning of the island.
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The Soviet government gladly stepped in to fill the void left by the American government
for its own geopolitical reasons. The Soviets agreed to purchase Cuba’s entire sugar product at
above world market prices and agreed to low-interest development loans. This gave the Soviets a
new ally a tiny distance from the United States. This is important to understanding Soviet
motives in the region, but it should first be understood with a disclaimer. Too often the Cuban
Revolution and its government have, from this moment forward, been regarded as pawns or a
satellite of the Soviet Union.80 There was a fraternal relationship, and a series of agreements that
certainly benefited the strategic interests of both parties; however, Fidel Castro continually
asserted political independence from Moscow. Examples are numerous and these are not the
focus of this project, but accurately assessing these events and Cuban-Soviet relations during this
period allows historians to think differently about Cuba’s conduct in the region and its responses
to counter-revolution both from within and without.81 Scholars must not make the mistake of
seeing Cuba as a proxy at this point whether out of unwitting fallacy or a Eurocentric approach
to the Cold War.
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Once Cuba’s sugar quota to the U.S. was cut off, the Revolutionary Government
nationalized all U.S. business interests in Cuba, and with that, the clandestine war began. Cuban
pilots on the payroll of the CIA bombed Cuban farmland and targets in Havana by late 1959,
prompting immediate defensive responses from the Cuban government that would, in the long
run, lead to victory in their Struggle Against Bandits.
Militias and Nationalizations
“Everyone knew a conflict was coming. You had to be blind not to see it. All we were
looking to do was live in our own house as we saw fit and that is not something any people
should have to demand from any other sovereign nation,” remembers Dr. Manuel Yepe.
According to him, the revolutionaries wanted to have relations and commerce with any nation
that would help their revolution progress, and the U.S. government considered that unacceptable.
“Because we decided to chart our own path there began to be acts of sabotage by counterrevolutionaries and then the horrendous explosion of La Coubre.”82 This brings us full circle to
the explosion described at the beginning of this project and Fidel Castro’s declaration in its
wake. It was a declaration of war. In his speech at the funeral of the bombing’s victims, he spoke
directly to the forces of the counter-revolution:
We make a promise to our fallen comrades, a promise forever. Cuba will never be intimidated,
Cuba will never go back.83 The revolution will not be stopped; the revolution will not go back.
The revolution will continue victoriously on its way, the revolution will continue on its march,
yielding to nothing! We will never be strong enough to attack anyone, not only because we do
not have enough men or arms or resources but because we have no right to attack anybody.84 Yet

82

Manuel Yepe, Conversation with the author in Havana, Cuba, July 2011.
Meaning to the politics of the pre-1959 period and subservience to Washington.
84
The leadership of the Cuban Revolution often asserted the position that just because a nation was large and
powerful did not give it the right to simple intervene in any part of the globe it desired particularly with the use of
force.
83

37

we feel strong enough to defend ourselves, because we are defending what is right and we know
how to defend that.85

The attack on La Coubre occurred amidst a number of other major events which, when
analyzed, convey the drama of the beginning of the clandestine war between Havana and
Washington. While the CIA was bombing Cuban cane fields to disrupt the harvest and
destroying La Coubre, the revolution was reforming and restructuring the Rebel Army and
organizing two other defensive bodies that would tip the balance in the battles to come, the
National Revolutionary Militias (MNRs) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
or (CDRs).86 The latter two organizations were meant to channel the desires of the general Cuban
population to defend themselves.. In October of 1959, the revolutionary government issued a
statement in response to the initial bombings of cane fields, announcing the formation of the
MNRs.87 The role of the militias was to recruit volunteers from the university and workers from
all industries, regardless of sex or vocation. The militias were meant to train the population to
defend itself in case of attack and to make sure that the country was effectively defended by its
increasingly politicized population in the form of a volunteer-based, radical working-class militia
that was trained and equipped by the state while the Rebel Army was restructured and re-armed.
Even as late as October of 1959, the Revolutionary Government lacked a source of
armament outside what was left in Cuba by Batista’s army. The Rebel Army and the newly
formed militias were still using the equipment captured from enemies in the Sierra Maestra,
almost all of which was of U.S. origin. Since the Eisenhower Administration had cut off trade
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with Cuba, other arms providers had to be found.88 Once again the Soviets filled the void and
agreed to provide Cuba with arms.89 It would take some time for the weapons to reach Cuba to
bolster the island’s defenses, and so for a time the militias took center stage as Cuba’s most
ready fighting force. By 1961 the Rebel Army would become the FAR, or Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Cuba, a more modernized conventional army that still retained its capabilities as a
guerilla fighting force, but with a steady supply of arms and conventional military training. It
would be these new militias and FAR units that would bring about the physical defeat of the
armed counter-revolutionary bands during the clandestine struggle and that would turn back the
invasion at the Bay of Pigs.90 Finally, the militias, combined with the reformation of the army,
preempted any possibility of a reactionary coup as had occurred in Cuba on previous occasions.
The leadership of the Cuban Revolution had learned the bitter lessons of Guatemala, Machado,
and Batista.
August 6th of 1960 was the last straw in the eyes of the U.S. government and its allies. On
that day, Cuba’s government finally nationalized all U.S. business holdings. The wealth of these
companies in Cuba was to be returned to the Cuban people by putting that revenue toward the
revolution’s expanding social programs. In a rousing speech at a Havana stadium, Fidel Castro
signed Law 980 into action. Many revolutionary supporters saw this as the last tie to the
oligarchy of the past being cut.91 After signing the document, Castro read aloud to the massive
crowd, the list of companies to be nationalized. Each name was met with jeers and cries of “get
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out!” from the crowd.92 “When Fidel called out the names of Standard Oil, Texaco, and United
Fruit Company, the crowed thundered in applause. These were the companies that had been seen
as exploitive toward us and we were happy to see them in our hands,” said Manuel Yepe in
remembering the event.93 Later, a massive demonstration took place along the malecón in
support of the nationalizations in which Cubans threw symbolic coffins, upon which were
printed the names of the newly nationalized large corporations, into the sea.94 This reaffirmation
of Cuban sovereignty was an act of a government that already saw itself under siege and at war;
it was at this point that counter-revolutionary action against Cuba increased and intensified.
CDRs and Fidel’s Visit to the U.N.
Fidel Castro traveled to the United States for a second time and addressed the United
Nations General Assembly in September of 1960. It was here that he demanded that the United
States stop its aggression towards Cuba and called on the nations of the world to condemn the
insults to Cuba’s sovereignty that were being carried out on a frequent basis.95 He highlighted the
fact that Cuba would defend itself and that its example would be followed all over the
developing world. “This great mass of Humanity has said enough and began to move, the march
of giants will not stop until the people attain true independence” were his words calling on the
people of the Third World to take up the call of the Cubans to join them in struggle against
reactionary forces.96
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This was not a subtle message. Castro was proclaiming that Cuba intended to resist, and
that the Cuban government was not willing to go back on its promises. Castro knew that the
reaction from Washington and Miami would be swift. Immediately after his return from New
York he founded the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).97 The CDRs were
neighborhood watch organizations led by volunteers, committed cadres of the revolution, who
would help train citizens in defense preparations, and who would hold regular meetings to
discuss revolutionary developments. They became the largest mass organization in Cuba charged
with monitoring counter-revolutionary activity and mobilizing the public against incursions into
Cuba. In essence, the CDRs became a public intelligence-gathering organization that helped
mobilize the citizenry in times of conflict, while remaining vigilant in times of peace.98 Other
roles fulfilled by the CDRs included volunteer labor, community cleanup, and mutual assistance.
CDRs became places of learning and ideological commitment. Critics of the revolution see the
CDRs as a massive spy network designed to pit citizens against one another in an effort to sniff
out ideological imperfections. Though there was an element of surveillance to the CDRs they
have historically been far from the Stalinist bodies they are typically portrayed as outside of
Cuba. The CDRs have historically served not just in defense but also in campaigns against
disease, and they aided educational reform, ran breakfast programs for children, and helped form
the FMC, or Federation of Cuban Women.99 The CDRs eventually helped the revolutionary
government not only defeat armed counter-revolutionary bands, but also served as a unifying
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body in the face of the adverse conditions of the clandestine struggle and the hardships of the
U.S. embargo.
By mid-1960 the board was set and the pieces were in motion. Within the first year and a
half of Cuba’s revolutionary process, there had been earthshaking reforms to Cuban society. The
land had been redistributed and the foreign companies had been removed. The state was being
restructured by feisty young leaders who were determined to assert Cuba’s sovereign right to
conduct itself as it saw fit.100 The mass organizations meant to shore up Cuba’s defense were
being organized and trained. Revolutionary supporters joined mass organizations or the armed
forces to take part in the revolutionary process. Thousands sought to heed the warnings of their
leaders, that without creating the apparatuses to defend the revolution from both internal and
external threats, the revolution would be destroyed by reactionary elements as they had been in
many other parts of the Americas.
The Literacy Campaign
Hundreds of thousands of Cubans in 1961 answered the call when that year was declared
the year of literacy. Running concurrently with the “Struggle against Bandits” Cuba’s leadership
organized a massive, nation-wide literacy campaign that remains of the most admired triumphs
and shining moments of the Cuban Revolution. Before the revolution experts place Cuba’s
illiteracy rate at 23.6 percent.101 Over the course of 1961, young people were mobilized and
trained to teach. They were sent in brigades to the countryside to work with the farmers by day
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and teach them by lamplight at night. Teenage women and men traveled into every community,
and, by November of 1961, Cuba was declared free of illiteracy. This was an unprecedented
success whose model has been utilized by Cuban volunteer teachers ever since all over the
world.102 The campaign served as one more massive popular mobilization which helped to foster
a sense of community in many Cubans as well as give them a stake in their revolution.103
Eventually as the clandestine war intensified, many of these young teachers would come under
fire and became casualties (a number as will be seen were murdered by counter-revolutionary
bands).104 The campaign was not suspended, and, rather than frighten people away, the attacks
increased popularity of the literacy campaign. What is often overlooked in the few analyses
available of the 1961 literacy campaign is that even in a time of national emergency, the popular
reforms continued.
For their part, Washington and Miami were quick to prove correct the revolutionaries’
assertion that they sought to destroy the Cuban revolutionary process. As tensions increased, the
CIA under the Eisenhower Administration increased its subversive activities in Cuba. The CIA
began recruiting assets and drawing up plans to clandestinely funnel them into Cuba to wreak
havoc on the recently nationalized economy and eventually to take up arms against the new state.
Within the first year of the clandestine struggle, as will be seen in the following chapter,
numerous umbrella organizations were recruited, armed, funded, and trained in the U.S. and
Central America to pave the way for counter-revolutionary activity on the island. The U.S.
government saw itself as slighted by the young rebels, Wall Street saw their bottom lines suffer,
and the Cuban upper classes that were leaving the island were maddened by then the loss of their
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bower base and privileges. This mixture of anger, hubris, and economic ambition would set in
motion the subversive actions of the counter-revolution that would continue until the final defeat
of the armed groups in the Escombray Mountains in 1963. In the following chapter, we will
analyze the clandestine machinations of the CIA and their counter-revolutionary Cuban allies.
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Chapter 2

The Victory at Playa Gíron and the Birth of the Mambí Commandos

“We are standing in the water!”
Blue Beach: Playa Girón, April 19th 1961
“The beachhead perimeter is being breached! Massed artillery is inbound and enemy air
force is continuing to strafe brigade positions. Tanks are closing in on Blue Beach. Militia and
brigade forces are fighting on the beach. We are about to be overrun! Where is the air-support
damn it?! We are standing in the water. Help must arrive within the hour!” This was a series of
radio transmissions and coded wire cables sent by José “Pepe” San Román, the field commander
of Brigade 2506, to Grayston L. Lynch, the coordinating officer of the Central Intelligence
agency on board the merchant ship Blagar in the last moments of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs.
After being told that orders were being awaited from Washington, Román reported that his
position was under attack and that he was destroying his radio equipment, and the survivors were
going to flee into the swamp.105 Before Lynch could reply, the line went dead, effectively cutting
off communications between the most expensive and long-planned U.S. operation against Cuba
of that time, and the American intelligence apparatus that had funded, trained, and deployed it.
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For almost three days straight, the 2506 Brigade fought to maintain its tenuous beachhead
in southern Cuba. After nearly two years of preparation, the solders of the strike force felt
confident that their effort to invade Cuba and spark a national uprising could be nothing but a
success. The brigade was made up of members of the Cuban business class and the sons of
wealthy Cuban landowners, former members of Batista’s military, and disaffected former
members of the revolutionary movement who rejected the radicalization of the Cuban political
process. The nearly 1,400 soldiers had been recruited by the CIA and trained in secret bases in
Florida, Louisiana, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. CIA operatives and local Cuban assets
staged acts of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism to sow confusion and chaos to prepare for the
landing. The most important boost of confidence for the brigade was simply that they were being
organized, trained, and supported by the most powerful nation in the world which had promised
them all the military and logistical support they needed for their success. What the brigade and
their CIA station chiefs did not count on was the passionate and tenacious resistance of the
Cuban public that would literally drive them into the sea. In all of their confident theorizing, they
seemed to have forgotten the Cuban people.
Books about the Invasion of Playa Gíron number well into the hundreds. It is not the
purpose of this study to delve deeply into the battle itself or into a day by day account. This has
been well covered elsewhere.106 It is the purpose of this study to frame this monumental event in
the context of the Struggle Against Bandits. In other words, what role did the clandestine groups
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infiltrated into Cuba before the invasion play in the invasion itself, and how did the outcome
further the evolution of these groups and the Cuban Government’s response to them? As a result
of the CIA’s failure at Playa Gíron, the strategy of the counter-revolution shifted from one of
sabotage and harassment, to outright invasion, and then into a period of autonomous operations.
The defeat of the mercenary battalion on the sands of Playa Gíron is too often, within the
scholarship in the United States and popular political discourse in the U.S., viewed as simply a
resounding failure, a fiasco and a disaster. While this is an accurate characterization, it is rarely
viewed through a Cuban lens. For the Cubans, Gíron was the first defeat of a U.S.-backed act of
intervention in the Americas. What is more, within U.S. academic circles and U.S. popular
culture, it is common to analyze the failure of the invasion and the preliminary actions of the
counter-revolutionary fifth column through an entire body of circumstances ranging from the
weather to presidential order. Examples of this appear in the constant debate surrounding
President John Kennedy’s withdrawal of air support over the beaches, and his unwillingness to
commit U.S. combat troops to the invasion. Other examples appear in debates about the role of
the weather the day of the landing, and accidents such as when the invasion force was spotted by
charcoal makers walking the beach. All of these factors naturally played a role in the failure of
the operation, but academics in the U.S. and outside of Cuba commonly elide the most important
factor, the Cubans themselves.107
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Upon hearing of the invasion, hundreds of thousands of Cubans from all over the island
turned out into the streets, demanding weapons from the government.108 The Cuban Revolution’s
base of support was stronger in that moment than it has ever been, and the invasion force was not
met as a group of liberators as the brigade had been convinced it would be. Rather, they were
met as mercenary invaders at the service of a foreign government who sought to roll back the
reforms that had benefitted so many Cuban citizens.109 When viewed through this lens and from
the perspective of the supporters of the Cuban Revolution, a view so rarely seen within the U.S.
academy, the invasion of Playa Gíron serves as an example of the overall defeat of the counterrevolution due to lack of popular support. The Bay of Pigs serves as a vivid demonstration that
the efforts to subvert, sabotage, terrorize, and derail the Cuban Revolution, though damaging,
costly, and traumatic, were mostly failures. They were failures because the counter-revolution
lacked sympathy and support from the broader Cuban population.
The 2506 Brigade that landed at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 remains the most well-known
counter-revolutionary unit, but they were not the only organization in operation at the time, and
many of its survivors would play roles in the clandestine struggle well beyond the 1961 invasion.
The 2506 leadership had close ties to the media and were openly courted by the Kennedy White
House, but what developed in the period between the breakdown of relations between Cuba and
the United States in 1959 and the invasion was the creation of a complex web of counterrevolutionary organizations backed by the CIA. Each of these organizations used and were used
by American policy makers for their own political ends. Though all operated with CIA guidance
and Washington’s participation, they were not a monolithic group. The sheer complexity of the
108

Fidel Castro, “We Relied on a Revolutionary People,” Playa Girón: Bay of Pigs, Washington’s First Military
Defeat in the Americas (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2001), p. 186-192.
109
Fidel Castro, “Speech and Reflection on the First Anniversary of Playa Girón,” History of an Aggression
(Havana: Ediciones Venceremos, 1964), p. 14-22.

48

counter-revolutionary web spun by the CIA and influential émigré leaders is overlooked by
many historians. In overlooking this, the real extent of the clandestine struggle becomes lost as
does its transformative effect on U.S. policy.
From Miami to Clandestinity
The previous chapter discussed the radical reforms and restructuring of the Cuban
political and economic landscape. The domestic counter-revolution, made up of members of the
upper and middle classes, former Batista military men and political supporters, and
representatives of the American mafia, would eventually form diverse pockets of opposition to
the revolution and would enjoy preferential treatment and logistical support from Washington. In
reality, all organized groups that took up arms to roll back the Cuban Revolution were recruited
and organized by the Central Intelligence Agency.110 The émigré community provided the
recruits and the operatives, but the U.S. Government supplied the organizational structure,
funding, and equipment. Over the years, differences between these organizations would develop
as would continual shifts in strategic thinking on the part of American policy makers. These
strategic shifts were direct results of the continual frustration and defeat of most of the operations
undertaken.
Miami became and remains the epicenter of anti-Castro sentiment in the United States,
outside the seat of government in Washington D.C. and perhaps in many ways even more so. In
the months following Fulgencio Batsita’s flight from Cuba, his upper and middle-class
supporters began to leave for the United States. Eventually, as the revolutionary process
radicalized and expanded its reforms, more and more of the business class began to leave for
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Miami assuming that there would be yet another change in government in short order. There was
a common sentiment in the émigré community that Washington would not let the actions of the
new Cuban government stand. The Cuban government was nationalizing U.S. industries and
landholdings and asserting strict national sovereignty. The United States government had
invaded and occupied Latin American nations over the course of a century for much less.111
Cuba, the émigrés thought, would be no different.112 Though Fidel Castro traveled to the United
States almost immediately after coming to power in an effort to establish, at the very least, civil
relations with the U.S., with a foreign policy based on respect among equals, the Eisenhower
Administration looked for ways to pressure the young leader to moderate his stances on a
number of issues. As a backup plan, the Eisenhower Administration began preparing operatives
to take action against the new state.113
Miami became a city filled with those who stood to lose, not only with the ouster of
Batista but also with the growing nationalizations of industry. Miami was not unlike many parts
of Southern France following the Independence of Algeria which was taking place at the same
time. It was a place filled with the angry overthrown. It was a place filled with wealthy people
who resented Castro and his revolutionary movement. One of these men was Rafael Martínez
Pupo. Martínez Pupo, who will figure prominently as this study progresses, was a wealthy
industrialist who had owned multiple large businesses and tracts of land before the reforms and
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who would eventually become the spokesperson for one of the most well-funded and organized
counter-revolutionary groups that infiltrated Cuba under CIA direction, the Comandos
Mambíses. The case of Rafael Martínez Pupo serves as a common (though in this case little
known) example in the development of the Cuban counter-revolution. Martínez’s example
provides a compelling window into the inner workings of the counter-revolutionary
organizations that claimed independence but were part of the CIA network. The anti-Castro
groups occupied a tenuous position between asserting their own political independence and
credibility while falling under the auspices of the CIA. The anti-Castro operatives were by no
means monolithic and had their own aims and goals, but all were in some way beholden to the
CIA. This would plague them well beyond the period discussed in this study.
Martínez Pupo rose to become one of the most prominent links between the CIA and the
Miami organizations, but he began in the same as many other upper-class counterrevolutionaries. Martínez had been an industrialist and landowner with a pedigree. His grandson,
Alejandro de la Cruz, recorded his grandfather’s story in a privately published biography filled
with grandiose notions of historical reincarnation.114 Martínez is described as a man with family
ties dating all the way back to the Spanish conquistadores. The Martínez family had supposedly
been involved in the struggle against Spain in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Following
the U.S. intervention in 1898, they made millions in the sugar industry and through multiple
businesses including property rental, shops, and restaurants. Martínez made large profits during
the Batista years, but according to the narrative of his grandson and those who knew him, he also
understood that it would be beneficial to play both sides of the Cuban revolutionary struggle.
Though his businesses were flourishing in the late 1950s under Batista, Martínez understood that
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if Batista lost the war, there would be a new government he would have to deal with, and,
regardless of who was in power, he desired preferential treatment. The answer to the dilemma
was to hedge his bets. Martínez sent small trucks of supplies such as medicines and food up to
the rebels in the mountains in an effort to foster a friendly relationship with the revolutionary
movement even as he continued to fill Batista’s coffers. From the perspective of those like
Rafael Martínez and other industrialists who either grew tired of Batista’s brutality or were
attempting to play both sides, there was very little that was new about Castro’s movement. There
had been armed struggles and revolutions before in Cuba, and all of them, for nearly a century,
had ended in the same ways. Either the movement was crushed by the government with U.S.
backing, or the new governments brought into power were bought off or took part in the same
graft as the regimes before them.115 What was going to be so different about Castro?
By the mid-1960s, Martínez and many others like him were feeling betrayed and that
their “investment” of support was being overlooked as the Revolutionary Government
nationalized industry and large landholdings.116 While hundreds of thousands received land of
their own, homes of their own, or had their rents slashed, the battle lines were being drawn as the
nationalizations continued and the former owners continued to leave for Miami. The
revolutionary government understood, however, that there were members of the business classes
who had been against Batista and also had the technical and administrative knowledge to
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continue to run the economy once it was restructured. The government made propositions to a
number of those who had aided the rebels. Many were offered high-level government and
administrative positions in an effort to give them a place within the revolution. Castro offered
Martínez an ambassadorship.117 The new government needed personnel with business experience
and good international standing to help rebuild and restructure the country and its economic
system, but many would have no part in it. Martínez, a millionaire and militant Catholic, refused
to participate in what he saw as the encroachment of “godless communism” in Cuba.118 While
his family and so many other, more conservative, Cubans chose to emigrate, Martinez instead
traveled to Central America, where he owned a great deal of property, and placed himself at the
disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency.119 His story is a common one within the
conservative émigré community. What is unique about Martínez is how his presence continually
re-emerges in numerous aspects of the clandestine struggle. Through intermediary contacts,
beginning in 1960, Martínez began to take an active role in the attempts to remove Castro from
power. This coincided with the beginning of what came to be called the “Controlled Period of
Operations.” 120
While the CIA infiltrated small isolated groups into Cuba and used Mafia connections to
make scattered attacks on Cuban targets under orders from the Eisenhower Administration, they
sought locations to train a secret strike force made up of Cuban émigrés that would invade Cuba
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on the back of a wave of sabotage.121 Part of that problem was solved by Martínez Pupo, who
owned large tracts of land in Guatemala. He voluntarily turned this farmland deep in the
Guatemalan countryside over to the CIA, and the training of what would become the 2506
Brigade began.122
Counter-Revolutionary Activity 1959-1961: The Controlled Period
After Castro’s overtures were rejected in Washington and as the revolution went ahead
with its reforms, the Eisenhower Administration tasked the CIA with laying the groundwork to
remove Castro from power and organize a counter-revolutionary front that would return to power
those more apt to bow to Washington’s interests. The organizations were to be tightly controlled
and would implement a two-pronged attack on the Cuban Revolution. They were to sabotage and
attack economic targets, causing as much damage as possible to the Cuban economy, and they
were to train operatives that would be infiltrated into Cuba to help spark an island-wide
opposition movement. Initially the CIA worked closely with former members of Batista’s
military and their Mafia contacts.123 They had what were thought to be the connections and
experience to maintain a counter-revolutionary movement.124 With unmarked planes launched
from the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, the Batistanos napalmed sugar
cane fields and strafed parts of Havana on several occasions.125
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From early on these efforts were met with resistance from within Cuba. The Cuban
Revolutionary Intelligence services had very effective networks of loyal agents in place in
Miami and across Central America, and they received a great deal of cooperation from private
citizens in Cuba, particularly at the neighborhood level and at the workplace.126 As the popular
reforms expanded and the United States cut off the sugar quota and placed additional sanctions
on Cuba, and the acts of aggression expanded to pirate attacks on Cuban ships and port
installations.127 These counter-revolutionary groups were able to cause a considerable amount of
damage to farmlands and factories, but the counter-revolution’s efforts to create enough chaos
and fear that people turned away from the popular reforms was unsuccessful. The expanded
introduction of Cuban agents into the Miami community and the vigilance of neighborhood
watch committees led to the foiling of an even greater number of counter-revolutionary plots.
Counter-revolutionaries were frequently apprehended not long after entering the country, and
many attempts at sabotage and destabilization failed because as security improved, the plans
were often foiled before being put into action.128 A reason for this lack of success is that the
general public rejected these groups because they were made up of former Batistanos. Even the
CIA recognized that there had to be a shift in recruitment simply because many people in Cuba
did not want to provide aid and comfort to their former oppressors. Eventually the Batistano
organizations were defunded and faded into obscurity while many of their most militant
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operatives folded into later organizations. The CIA was placed in a position in which it would
have to distance itself from many prominent Batistanos, though they remained ardent counterrevolutionaries. They had lost their standing within Cuba. Instead, the CIA would turn to wellplaced men who were not prominent former members of the Batista government, but who were
willing to take action against the revolution, men like Rafael Martínez.
While Rafael Martínez Pupo’s land was being used as a training ground for the CIA’s
infiltration teams, the agency already had operations in the planning stages that were meant, in
theory, to bring about the defeat of the revolution through an underground insurrection led by
infiltrated CIA operatives working with local underground counter-revolutionaries.129 Between
early to mid-1960, the idea was to continue the destabilization activities with the operatives
already on the ground in Cuba while preparing a special detachment of Cuban émigrés in
Guatemala and Nicaragua to be parachuted into Cuba to carry out hit and run attacks that would
inspire those against the revolution within Cuba to take up arms.130 This plan was formulated on
the assumption that within Cuba there were large numbers of citizens with anti-revolutionary
sentiments. In 1960, the largest act of counter-revolutionary terror up to that point came in the
form of the previously mentioned, CIA bombing of La Coubre. Counter-revolutionary terrorist
activity was reaching new levels. It was expanding from phantom air raids and scattered acts of
sabotage to the bombings of civilian workplaces.
The Revolutionary Government was not naïve, it understood that these were well-funded,
well-organized attacks. Military personnel were not the only victims of the counter-revolution.
The majority of Cuban citizens killed by counter-revolutionary operatives in this period were
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civilians.131 Between late 1960 and early 1961 there was a wave of department store fire
bombings that were a part of the destabilization campaign meant to pave the way for the planned
internal uprising by the anti-Castro forces on the island. The most famous of these took place just
days before the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bombing at the El Encanto, the largest and most wellknown department store in Havana. After closing time, a single CIA operative, after being paid,
placed flammable material in one of the clothing departments and set the store ablaze. The
counter-revolutionaries were attempting to send a message to the revolution’s supporters that
nationalized property was to be targeted. The building was quickly engulfed in flames. A lone
worker, Fe de Valle, a member the CTC, the central trade union, had just left work at the store
and locked the doors. She rushed back into the store in an attempt to save a cashbox that had
been filled with funds for the agrarian reform and that was a donation in solidarity from the
union at the store to the union of small farmers. She was killed in her attempt.132 Thousands
marched in the funeral procession for Fe de Valle. This was one more symbolic moment where
rather than capitulating to the confusion and discontent that the CIA and their operatives sought
to sow, more and more Cubans instead joined the mass organizations, especially the militias and
CDRs.133
While the training and introduction of operatives continued, the counter-revolutionaries
undertook two more activities that were meant to inspire an island-wide anti-Castro uprising. By
the spring of 1961, Cuba’s massive volunteer literacy campaign was underway. CIA assets and
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local operatives attempted to dissuade Cuban citizens from participating in the campaign by
targeting literacy workers.134 Though by the end of 1961 the campaign was over and the island
celebrated its successful eradication of illiteracy, fourteen young literacy workers, mostly
teenagers, had been killed, all of them victims of counter-revolutionary activity. The first teacher
killed was a young student by the name of Conrado Benítez. A counter-revolutionary band
captured Benítez in the countryside while he was teaching an older farmer to read.135 Both the
elderly farmer and Benítez were tortured and hung as examples.136 Instead of being frightened,
hundreds of thousands of young people volunteered for the newly christened “Conrado Benítez
Brigades” named for the martyred teacher.137 Dr. Marta Nuñez Sarmiento was a fourteen year
old brigadista in 1961, and she remembers her reasons for joining the campaign very clearly.
“I was fourteen, we were all quite young but many of us had not been old enough to take
any active part in the anti-Batista struggle.” They wanted to do their part, said Nuñez, “I have
been to the United States, and I know that your Second World War generation to this day feels
very proud of their service, we were no different in this case.” For that generation, this was not
political rhetoric. “It was like cleaning up after a devastating storm and helping your neighbors.
In this case the storm was illiteracy. The deaths of the volunteer teachers saddened us but it also
gave us a sense that though we were not carrying guns into battle, we were fighting against an
enemy.”138
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If anything, what was accomplished by the counter-revolution, other than the murder of
Cuban citizens and the destruction of many workplaces, was to warn the Cuban intelligence
community that something bigger was brewing. Every major U.S. intervention before 1961, from
Iran to Guatemala, had been preceded by campaigns of disinformation and sabotage. Supporters
of the revolution understood that there would be more concentrated action on the part of the CIA,
but where and when? What the Cubans did not know was that a shift in the U.S. government and
Miami-based counter-revolutionaries’ strategy was underway.
Operation Pluto: The Shift from Sabotage to Invasion
As the Kennedy Administration ascended to the White House, they would order yet
further intensification of the activity against Cuba. Kennedy had labeled his opponent, Richard
Nixon, in the 1960 election as being “soft on Cuba.” The U.S. Embassy in Cuba was closed after
the Revolutionary Government forced it out upon discovering that some of the staff were
actually U.S. intelligence agents. It was at this point that Kennedy was informed of the expansive
plans to to remove Fidel Castro from power.139 Washington grew tired of the lack of results
coming from the infiltrated agents already in place. There was no uprising in support of the
counter-revolutionaries, and it seemed that without a reevaluation of tactics, Castro would
remain in power. JMWAVE, the Miami CIA operations center, was ordered to change plans by
the leadership of the agency. Faster results were demanded and so the strategy changed. The CIA
brought in new staff with more of an eye for conventional military action. A core group of
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veterans of the Offices of Strategic Services in the Second World War were tasked with
changing the operational plans for the Cuba Project. The new plan was called Operation Pluto.140
What began as a series of scattered hit and run sabotage actions meant to spark a
counter-revolutionary general strike, was changed by CIA headquarters at Langley to an all-out
conventional assault, orchestrated in a way to maximize plausible deniability of U.S.
involvement. In other words, a strike force would be deployed into Cuba but it would be made to
seem that the émigrés were acting on their own. The training centers were retooled, and orders
were changed. The counter-revolutionaries recruited amongst the émigrés and brought to Central
America began to retrain for amphibious landings rather than secret parachute drops and pirate
raids. The scattered cells that were originally going to be introduced into Cuba in a scattered
fashion were combined into a strike force of brigade strength, the 2506 Brigade.141 Operation
Pluto was based on the island-hopping campaign of the Second World War in the South
Pacific.142 The plan consisted of the clandestine groups that were already in place staging a wave
of sabotage while the counter-revolutionary radio stations would broadcast disinformation to
confuse the Cuban government. Kennedy added an addendum to the CIA plan: no U.S. military
personnel were to be utilized publicly for the sake of plausible deniability. Kennedy thought that
one of the reasons more people had not joined the counter-revolution was because the groups
were obviously not independent of U.S. or Batistano control. His idea was to give the appearance
that a militant group of independent anti-Castro fighters was taking matters into its own hands. A
provisional government in exile was created and immediately flown into the landing zone in
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order to be recognized by Washington upon the establishment of a stable beachhead in Cuba.
This would give a legitimate reason for the U.S. government to commit troops to aid the
“freedom fighters.”143
The zone of action was moved from the mountains of central Cuba to the Zapata swamp
in southern Cuba at a place called the Bay of Pigs. A day before the landing, a 2506 Brigade air
force flew bombing missions over Cuban airfields in an attempt to neutralize the small Cuban air
force on the ground.144 The planes bore Cuban insignia in an effort to make it seem that there
was a mutiny in the revolutionary air force.145 The landing was to begin within forty-eight hours,
in theory with the Revolutionary Air Force destroyed. This did not occur and was a major factor
in the defeat of the brigade. After a series of bombings in Havana in addition to the airstrikes, the
invasion began early on April 17th. A unit of brigade paratroopers landed in the Zapata swamp to
secure a foothold for the main body that landed before dawn. The moment a beachhead was
secured, the pre-organized “government in exile” was to be flown in, but none of this occured.
The airfields had been bombed, but the Revolutionary Air Force remained almost totally
intact.146 Though the landings took place in force as planned, instead of being welcomed on the
beach as returning heroes as they had been promised by their leaders, an angry populace in arms
turned out to throw the invasion back.147 Within hours, the CDRs had mobilized and aided state
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security in locating citizens under suspicion of being counterrevolutionaries. This sweep cut off
the invasion force from their prospective pockets of support.148
Fidel Castro personally took command of the revolutionary forces at the front, and, after
only forty eight-hours of intense combat, the invasion was turned back.149 The importance of the
seventy-two hours between the initial bombing of the Cuban airfields and the surrender of
Brigade 2506, though well-documented and analyzed, cannot be overstated, especially from the
perspective of the supporters of the Cuban Revolution and its leadership. It was just after the
bombings and on the eve of the landing, at the funeral for those killed in the airstrikes, that Fidel
Castro made one of the most important declarations in Cuban history:“ What the imperialists
cannot stand is that we are here, we exist, and we have made a socialist revolution right under
their noses and that we are willing to defend that revolution.”150
With this statement, Castro officially proclaimed the socialist character of the revolution.
This was a pivotal moment for the Cuban Revolution. It was a way of saying not only to the
enemies of the movement but also its supporters that there would be no turning back the clock.
The reforms would continue, and aggression would be resisted. Playa Gíron remains one of the
most celebrated events in Cuban history and popular memory. One militiaman remembers
feelings that many of his comrades in arms had just as they were moving off to the front. “This
was the moment we had all been preparing for. We had trained for months.” His unit was made
up of young students and workers from the city. Few of them had been involved with the armed
struggle against Batista, but this was seen as their chance to do their part. “We knew the likes of
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those who were coming to fight us. We had dealt with them for years, and people were ready and
they were angry.”151
The 2506 Brigade was initially able to entrench themselves in the Zapata swamp and near
the town of Playa Gíron, but once they came under attack from the Cuban Air Force, which they
had believed to have been destroyed, the situation changed. Meanwhile, the militias were sent
down the central highway to confront the invasion.152 It was here that the militia came under
attack from the 2506 Brigade aircraft that continued to fly bombing missions over the beachhead.
Columns of militia came under napalm attack on the central highway and casualties were high.
The first line of defense was in need of reinforcement. By the beginning of the third day of
fighting the 2506 Brigade’s ships were damaged and forced out to sea, and most of their planes
had been shot out of the sky. The Cubans were eventually able to amass artillery fire on the
beachhead, and a column of tanks broke through the invaders’ line of defense. In the face of
larger numbers of combatants, as well as air and artillery support, the 2506 Brigade was driven to
the water’s edge. Most of the invading brigade surrendered quickly.153 Again a militia man
remembers, “Before too long as the prisoners were being gathered, the comandante arrived. The
prisoners were quite worried that they would all be shot, but instead the comandante ordered that
they be given water, food, and medical treatment. I was only a teenager, but being a part of that
battle, the first defeat of Yankee Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere was the proudest
moment of my life.”154
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The counter-revolution was almost totally shattered by this defeat. Most of the 2506
Brigade was in custody, and the vast majority of their support groups in the cities were as
well.155 Only small detachments of counter-revolutionary operatives hiding in the mountains
remained operational. The U.S. government was discredited, and the Kennedy brothers were
furious with the CIA and also the anti-Castro community for their plummeting success rate. The
only thing more frustrating to the Kennedy Administration was the fact that their plausible
deniability was now shattered.156 Counter-revolutionary strategy once again shifted from one of
sabotage and invasion to one of assassination. Operation Mongoose, as it came to be called, was
a set of plans to assassinate Fidel Castro and other revolutionary leaders based on the assumption
that without Castro, the revolution would collapse. At this point, the clandestine war became far
more personal between the leaders in Washington and Havana. Mongoose operatives were pulled
from the ranks of the 2506 Brigade members who escaped capture on the beach, and from among
the most militant members of the Miami community. Mongoose ran concurrently with the use of
stepped-up acts of sabotage, but the focus would be on sowing confusion to help make an
assassination more likely.157
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Martínez Pupo and the Commandos Mambíses
In the aftermath of the shattering defeat at Playa Gíron, the counter-revolution was forced
to undergo yet a third transformation. The Kennedy administration had been humiliated by the
revolutionary forces and demanded that the CIA “do something about Castro once and for all.”158
From perspective of Kennedy and his advisors, too much money and effort had been spent with
too little to show for it. The Cuban Revolution was even more consolidated after the Bay of Pigs,
and most of the counter-revolutionary groups in Cuba had been decimated. Small pockets of
counter-revolutionaries who had eluded capture had been able to move from the cities into the
Escombray Mountains and were still staging low-intensity actions against economic and military
targets, but their limited support network in the cities had been almost totally removed by the
CDRs and state security services during and after the invasion. Thanks to the CDRs, in
cooperation with Cuban Intelligence, most known members of the counter-revolution had been
arrested, effectively cutting off the “bandits,” as they were finally officially labeled, from their
contacts.159 A new strategy had to be formulated. The plans for Operation Mongoose were
expanded by a new CIA leadership tasked with quickly making up for the ground lost at the Bay
of Pigs. The CIA station handlers and their closest assets undertook a host of assassination
attempts against Castro over the next few years.160
Rafael Martínez Pupo had watched the invasion of Cuba very closely.161 Martínez had
grown frustrated with what he saw as the mishandling of the war on Cuba. His land and money
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had been used to help fund and prepare the Bay of Pigs operation, but there was little to show for
it. It was then that he began to use his contacts to found a new counter-revolutionary
organization that could infiltrate Cuba and effectively wage war on the Cuban economy in a way
that even if citizens supported the revolution, they would grow weary of the constant economic
turmoil.162 Martínez became one of a growing body of counter-revolutionaries who began to be
just as frustrated with Washington as the Kennedy Administration was with them.163 There was a
growing sentiment that these prominent counter-revolutionaries could gain better results against
the revolution if the CIA provided funds and then stepped out of the way. Martínez began to
utilize his political and economic connections to help organize a new organization, the Comados
Mambíses.
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Chapter 3: La LuchaContra Bandidos
Spymasters, Raiders, Pirates, and Assassins
Ted Shackley was a CIA case officer in 1961. He was appointed to head up part of the
new task force organized in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. While Operation Mongoose and the
assassination campaign against Fidel Castro and the rest of the revolutionary leadership was
underway, it was Shackley who was meant to coordinate a second tier effort at aiding the
counter-revolutionaries remaining hidden in Cuba and maintaining pressure on the Cuban
economy and military through continued strikes.164 All of this fell under the newly adopted
strategy of “Autonomous Operations.” Counter-revolutionary organizations would now be
recruited, armed, and funded, but the operations themselves would be planned and executed by
the émigrés taking up arms themselves. This strategic philosophy was based upon the idea that if
the CIA was able to set a mass volume of operations running concurrently against Cuba, it was
more likely that one would be successful.165 This was a significant change from the previous
strategy of organizing all activity to supplement one major effort like the invasion at the Bay of
Pigs.
Rafael Martínez became one of Shackley’s first operators. Martínez had been involved at
various levels with the counter-revolution and the CIA since the earliest days of 1959, and in
every instance his resources and support had been used in what amounted to a series of failures.
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The transition to the autonomous period of clandestine activity provided Martínez and others like
him the opportunity to be in more direct control of how their resources were utilized. They were
also given the chance to choose their own targets and use their own contacts.166 These groups
were diverse in political standing and in their willingness to target civilians. This web of
autonomous organizations began training in secret locations in Central America and the U.S.
south. By early 1962, the first operations were being carried out. It should be reemphasized that
the autonomous groups were meant to take part in Operation Mongoose or at least supplement
that operation which had made the assassination of Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders the top
priority of clandestine activity.167
In essence it was the combination of these assassination attempts and the politics that
bred them, with the tactics of allowing well-equipped, well-trained, and well-funded counterrevolutionaries to operate with impunity that led to a cycle of terrorist activity that remains
ongoing. The further these groups were pushed from achieving their goal, the more
uncontrollable they became and eventually many of their activities went beyond what the U.S.
government had originally envisioned. U.S. government policy through the CIA had created a
counter-revolutionary monster that haunted U.S. policy makers until the Reagan Administration
reintroduced a policy of open hostility towards Cuba in the early 1980s and these assets were
once again reactivated as CIA operatives.
The Mongoose and Autonomous operational period was marked by competition between
counter-revolutionaries to maintain the financial patronage of the CIA. Two main camps
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developed.168 Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles are two examples of those competing
against other militants like Rafael Martínez for continued financial support. Their work
incorporated terror attacks against Cuban citizens as well as an extensive list of plans and
attempts on the life of Fidel Castro. Many of these plans rival Ian Fleming’s James Bond in their
cinematic flair. From the beginning of 1962 the attempts against Castro ran the gamut from
poisoned cigars and milkshakes, to attempts at the use of improvised explosives, bazooka
attacks, and snipers.169 The CIA utilized its contacts in the U.S. organized crime community to
incorporate new operatives who had maintained ties with many of the leaders of the counterrevolutionary émigrés. With the help of the Mafia, it was believed that once again the CIA could
maintain plausible deniability by blaming the Mafia for aggression on the one hand and working
along with them on the other.170 Eventually operatives like Bosch and Carriles came out on top
of the competition and went on to form Alpha 66 and Omega 7, two of the most notorious
terrorist organizations in the western hemisphere.
For his part, Rafael Martínez sought to prepare strikes on military and economic targets
in order to draw out Cuban military forces and engage them in hit and run attacks along the
Cuban coast. Though welcoming the assassination of Castro, Martínez’s strategy was meant to
resurrect an internal counter-revolution and one that would not be detected by Cuban
intelligence. To achieve this, he would create a counter-revolutionary organizations made up of
veterans. Men would be chosen for their special skills rather than simply their hatred of Castro
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and the Cuban Revolution.171 This was a new strategy within the counter-revolutionary
organization. Most of the other groups recruited en masse to bolster their ranks. Martínez did not
seek to recruit from the Miami University campus as so many others had. His recruits were to
come from veterans of the Bay of Pigs as well as Cubans who had served in the United States
army in both the Second World War and Korea.172 In essence, he would create a covert strike
force made up of professionals. The group would avoid capture by basing itself outside of Cuba.
The commandos would be organized into two units. The smaller of the two would be
made up of commandos smuggled ashore in Cuba who would operate with whatever counterrevolutionary bands were still roaming the coast. Their job would be to scout coastal targets for
the main body of the commandos, secure targets, and await the strike force to destroy them
before moving back out to sea. The main body of the commandos would be a small naval force
equipped with fast attack boats that would be difficult to trace on radar. To avoid infiltration and
capture by Cuban intelligence, the commando’s naval force would be stationed at secret bases in
southern Florida and in Central America where Martínez hosted a training center for the Bay of
Pigs. The naval force was organized to strike the pre-selected targets and disappear out to sea.
The small commando group in Cuba would then attempt to spread the word of the organization’s
success in an effort to inspire others to take action against the government in their own areas.
Martínez recruited an acquaintance who had been the head of the air force for the 2506 Brigade
and who had extensive evasion and concealment training. He was to lead the infiltration team
and in effect be the eyes and ears of the commandos in Cuba while Martínez would serve as the
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spokesman for the organization.173 The commandos trained throughout 1962 and began their
infiltration of Cuba, but things did not go entirely according to plan. Developments in Cuba
made infiltration more difficult than before.
Battle in the Escambray
1962 was an extremely active year in the clandestine struggle between Cuba and the
counter-revolution. While Operation Mongoose and all of the other counter-revolutionary
organizations began to rebuild their ranks and introduce new operatives into Cuba, the
Revolutionary Militias began to sweep the countryside. Brigades of MNR forces were deployed
in the Escambray and Sierra del Rosario mountain ranges in central and western Cuba. A number
of the attacks on Cuban military and economic targets as well as assassination attempts
originated from these areas. The Cuban government sought to get rid of these “bandits,” as they
were officially called, and cut off the external counter-revolution from its internal operatives.
This little-known chapter in Cuban revolutionary history was marked with nearly two years of
combat in the mountains of Cuba in what was essentially a contra-style conflict. Though the last
of the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escambray were not defeated until early 1964, late
1962 and early 1963 were the most intense periods of armed conflict between the militias and the
counter-revolutionaries.174
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The throughout 1962, the militias broke into sweeping units that would move about the
mountains in order to draw out the counter-revolutionaries. When engaged, the militias would
surround a particular area and in many cases the commandos simply surrendered. In other cases,
however, there were intense firefights between the militia and the commandos. The fighting
often took a very personal turn. Many of the counter-revolutionaries became well known in their
areas of operation, and the combat often took on the characteristics of manhunts.175 Victor
Dreke, a revolutionary leader who was charged with leading the “Brigadas Lucia Contra
Bandidos” or “Struggle Against Bandit Brigades” as the militia units were officially called, has
written about the fighting in the Escombray. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion and the murder
of literacy workers the militia ranks were growing, and most engagements with the counterrevolutionaries resulted in militia victories. These firefights with the militia made it more
difficult for other commando groups to operate. Commandos like those led by Rafael Martínez
had problems infiltrating Cuba as more and more of the coast was being patrolled by militia.
Meanwhile, potential recruits to Marínez’s organization were caught in encirclements and
firefights with revolutionary forces. By the fall of 1962 the training of Martínez’s commandos
was moving forward, but the activities of Operation Mongoose and the counter-revolutionary
bands in the Escombray were temporarily halted by order of Washington. Cold War
developments forced the efforts against Cuba to stall as the world stood on the brink of nuclear
war in October of 1962.176
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The October Crisis
In the face of invasion, embargo, and personal assassination attempts, the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba entered into new defense talks with the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been
providing Cuba with conventional weapons since just before the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and
this had increased exponentially in the days afterwards. Soviet personnel were training Cuban
troops and helping to install anti-aircraft units on the island. Following the almost constant
attacks, the Cuban leadership requested additional support. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
proposed that the Soviet Union install intercontinental ballistic missiles on the island. The chain
of events surrounding what became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis in the U.S. and the
October Crisis in Cuba is well known. It is not my purpose to provide a re-narration of these
events and the complex negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.177 This
project is concerned with the Cuban perspective on these events, and how they corresponded to
the conduct of the clandestine struggle which was ongoing when U.S. spy planes discovered the
missiles in Cuba.
The Cubans were caught in a difficult situation. The U.S. had already invaded once, and
harassment against the revolution was increasing. Though it was understood that nuclear
weapons could, in theory, help defend Cuba from a conventional invasion, their presence on the
island was problematic. The revolutionary leadership understood that the missiles were of little
use against the counter-revolutionaries. Of equal concern to Fidel Castro was that Cuba maintain
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the moral high ground in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.178 The Cuban Revolution was succeeding
in maintaining its image as a David resisting a massive Goliath to the north. The Soviet
government recommended that the missiles be installed clandestinely and at the opportune
moment, forcing them upon the U.S. government in an effort to open more aggressive talks about
reducing the activities against Cuba and removing the U.S.’s nuclear weapons from Turkey. The
Cuban leadership accepted the missiles for two reasons. First, it was important that Cuba be able
to defend itself against a second invasion, a very real possibility at the time, and second, because
of the Cuban leadership’s sense of internationalism. Castro felt that by accepting the missiles, the
socialist bloc would in turn be strengthened and a new defensive position could be established.179
Most importantly, Castro recommended that the delivery of the missiles be made public. By
doing this, Cuba and the Soviets could maintain the moral high ground by not operating
secretively and could possibly force the issue of negotiations with Washington without even
installing the missiles. Castro calculated that the threat of the missile installation might have
been enough to bring Kennedy to the negotiating table.180
Castro assumed that Cuba would be included in all of the negotiations that would
eventually take place regarding the missiles and Cuba’s sovereignty. This was not the case. Over
the course of the negotiations in October of 1962, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war
and Cuba was not invited to the negotiations. Eventually, the U.S. and Soviet governments
agreed to a withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for the removal of U.S.
missiles in Turkey and what amounted to a verbal agreement that the United States government
would not invade Cuba. Castro and the Cuban leadership were furious. They had been treated
178

Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, Fidel Castro: My Life- A Spoken Autobiography (New York: Scribner, 2006),
p. 271-291.
179
Jorge Risquet, Interview with Estela Bravo, Havana, Cuba, Fidel the Untold Story, First Run Features, 2003.
180
Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Interview with Estela Bravo, Fidel the Untold Story, First Run Features, 2003.

74

like children by both sides.181 In the event of a nuclear exchange, Cuba would have been the first
place obliterated. The missiles were never under Cuban control and had been removed without
their consent. Today the October Crisis is viewed in Cuba as a dark moment when their
sovereignty was violated by both allies and enemies. The Cubans, both at the government level
and much of the population, were enraged that conditions on behalf of Cuba were not tied to the
removal of the missiles. The Cuban leadership demanded more than just a promise not to invade
Cuba militarily. They also wanted the U.S. to leave the Guantanamo Naval Base, cease all
counter-revolutionary activity, and lift the trade embargo.182 None of these stipulations were
placed upon the U.S. government in their negotiations with the Soviets. These events led to a
souring of relations with the Soviet Union that lasted nearly two years and opened the doors for a
possible reevaluation of Cuban foreign policy.183 At the same time, these events had strong
implications for the conduct of the counter-revolution and the CIA.
Because of the tension between the superpowers and the risk of nuclear war, the Kennedy
administration ordered the CIA to contact all of its counter-revolutionary operatives and halt all
further operations.184 There was fear that continued action could spark a war. It was possible that
Soviet personnel could be killed or the missiles damaged and set off, triggering a conflict. There
were too many scenarios to prepare for, so clandestine activity was halted. Halting operations
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was a difficult task. The web of counter-revolutionary organizations was large and complex.
Many operatives were out of direct contact with the CIA, and some were caught in engagements
with the militia. Many counter-revolutionaries now lost confidence in the Kennedy
administration for a second time. To some, Kennedy was linked to the military defeat of the Bay
of Pigs and now that the autonomous organizations were operative, they were being held back. 185
For a number of months, organizations like Rafael Martínez Pupo’s risked being deactivated
before ever being officially sent into action.
Operatives
The October Crisis had just ended and a loophole remained in the agreement between the
U.S. and Soviet governments. Though the United States had agreed publicly not to invade Cuba,
nothing was said about the support for counter-revolutionaries or any of their possible activities.
Because these were not uniformed U.S. soldiers and there was no military invasion of Cuba,
Operation Mongoose and the general clandestine efforts against Cuba were actually increased
rather than halted in the days following the October Crisis. The orders to halt activity were
rescinded, and Shackley went back to work. In his memoirs, Ted Shackley describes his first
meeting with Rafael Martínez Pupo in the fall of 1962. Shackley and his aides had been
recommended a meeting with an operative who had done work with “the company” before. In
private correspondence he was known only as “M.” Shackley’s office had been notified that “M”
had been organizing a commando unit that specialized in naval attacks and would complement
the autonomous operations well. Upon their meeting, Shackley described Martínez as a
committed and dignified gentleman who was “just what the doctor ordered.” Shackley described
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him as an honest man who “just wanted to do something against Castro.”186 Because of
Martinez’s past work with the agency during the preparations for the invasion and his contacts in
Central America, Shackley felt that he could travel abroad and effectively fulfill his role as the
spokesman for the commandos. Martínez officially christened the organization the Comandos
Mambíses shortly after their meeting. Ironically, the name given to this CIA-sponsored
organization harkens back to the Cuban Wars of Independence. The Mambis were the insurgents
who fought against the Spanish. Though a little-known organization with an independently
minded spokesman, the commandos were once again in many ways simply a CIA front
organization which hurt their image with ordinary Cubans.187
On August 18th 1963, after a substantial number of months organizing in the wake of the
militia sweeps on the island and preparing to make their presence known, the Comandos
Mambíses attacked their first target.188 Rafael Martínez entered the Miami Herald office in
Guatemala City and announced that the Commandos had bombed the oil refinery in Casilda, on
the southern coast of Cuba. Martínez claimed that the Commandos would liberate Cuba with the
more than one thousand operatives they had in Central America, the Dominican Republic and
within Cuba itself. In reality there were fewer than fifty commandos, most of whom were combat
veterans with few contacts outside the CIA.189 This was a crack organization of hardline Special
Forces rather than a spontaneous group of ordinary men. The attack was a great success for the
commandos. Heavy damage was done to the oil refinery almost totally knocking it out of action.
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The refinery had been one of the largest and most important in Cuba. The commandos then
disappeared out to sea. Upon his declaration at the newspaper office in Guatemala, Martínez also
released the “Declaration of the Principles of the Mambí Commandos.”190 This manifesto,
written by Martínez, outlined the Commandos’ philosophy and political aims. Interestingly
enough, in an act of political theater, the document claimed that the Commandos had no political
or economic goals set out for themselves. According to the document, the Commandos sought
only to remove the “communist dictatorship” from power and reestablish a free market based on
the equality of all men. The Commandos’ program was in essence a declaration of war against
the economic facilities and institutions in Cuba that allowed the government and its policies to
function. The members of the Comandos Mambíses were said to be men from all parts of Cuba
who were patriots and desired the liberation of Cuba from what they saw as a godless form of
oppression. In the manifesto, though he was the architect of the entire organization, Martínez
was labeled merely as the spokesperson for the group. A mysterious operative, “Ignacio,” was
credited with being the group’s leader inside Cuba.191 “Ignacio” was Manuel Villanueva who had
been secretly sent to Cuba. The choice of naming him the leader of the group had two purposes.
One was to create an inspiring, and Robin Hood-style aura surrounding the Commandos. The
other was to make it seem as if the Commandos were a grassroots Cuban resistance movement.
The Comandos’ manifesto made one more declaration. It announced its next attack. On
October 19, 1963, the Commandos announced that they would destroy the major lumber
production site at Cayo Guin in Oriente Province in the far east of the island.192 Their promise
was kept. In the early morning hours of the 19th of October, the Commandos went ashore and
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bombed the mill, causing extensive damage.193 The Commandos once again disappeared. Their
hit and run tactics had been honed to a fine edge. Up to this point their operations had run very
smoothly. In order to prevent infiltration by Cuban intelligence, the Commandos were never
alerted of their targets or their mission days until just hours before the attacks. They would
receive calls at their secret places of residence in southern Florida and would rendezvous late at
night. Together the operatives would board the “Rex,” the specialized attack boat that was
designed by the CIA for secret demolition operations. It was quiet and heavily armed in order to
defend itself against Cuban or Soviet patrol boats.194 Once off the coast and within range of their
target, the commando team would board smaller, fast-moving landing craft and move toward
shore. Once in range, the infiltration team led by “Ignacio,” who, in theory, had already secured
the target site, would then signal the teams on the boats with infrared flashlights. The teams
would then plant C4 explosives and flee the scene. These attacks were initially quite successful.
After the first two operations, the Mambi Commandos successfully struck at least two other
targets in 1963.195
As word spread about the success of the Mambi Commandos, the revolutionary
government deployed more militia units to coastal refineries and docks.196 Communiqués
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released by the Commandos called upon the Cuban people the shake off their fear and rise up as
crusaders against communism. At times the Commandos would broadcast from radio stations in
Guatemala and scatter leaflets in Cuba that bore the Commando logo and demanded an almost
religious struggle against the revolution.197 A number of them called on the Cubans to serve a
“just god and combat godless communism.”198 The Cuban media denounced the pirate attacks
against Cuba as further acts of terrorism against the nation even after the agreements between the
U.S. and Soviet governments in the wake of the Missile Crisis. Castro also ordered Cuba’s patrol
boats farther out to sea in an effort to create a defensive perimeter around Cuban’s coastline in
vulnerable areas.199 On October 21st the Commandos’ luck ran out. The target on that particular
evening was the large copper mine near Cape Corrientes in the province of Pinar del Rio. After
the increased deployment of militias to the area during the mop-up operations described earlier,
the mine was heavily guarded. Evidently, “Ignacio’s” infiltration team had been unable to call
off the mission, and the Commandos sailed into an ambush. Rather than being met with the
signal to land, they were met with intense gunfire from the militias. Not wanting to sacrifice the
mothership, the “Rex,” to the Cubans, the CIA operatives onboard left the coastline, abandoning
the operatives who were already in action. The latter were taken prisoner. On the following day,
Castro appeared on television denouncing the attacks and describing the Rex.200 He called upon
the Kennedy administration to explain these continued acts of hostility. There was no comment
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form the White House.201 The Comandos Mambíses were in shambles after a short lived string of
successes that had caused serious damage to the Cuban economy. A number of major events
occurred almost concurrently that would have important implications for the Commandos, U.S.
policy, and the international climate of hostility surrounding the Cuban Revolution. During the
last months of 1963 a president was murdered, a grand counter-revolutionary plot was hatched,
and, finally, an entire foreign policy approach shifted.
The Rafael Plan
Rafael Martínez Pupo supposedly only spoke to a select few about his time working with
the CIA. His grandson, Alejando de la Cruz, was able to compile his grandfather’s recollections
for posterity. This is valuable even if the book they were compiled into is meant to be a grand
work of genealogical narrative. It is through these conversations that a window into Martínez’s
expanding role in the counter-revolution can be found. By late October 1963, with the
widespread defeat of the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escombray and the capture of a large
group of the Commandos, Martínez began to organize what would have been one of the most
ambitious counter-revolutionary plots up to that point. Martínez began to utilize his business
contacts from across Central America to attempt to organize a second invasion of Cuba. The
constant back stepping of the Kennedy Administration on the issue of Cuba and clandestine
action against Castro prompted Marínez to begin to theorize a second invasion with a larger
strike force and backing that would remain firmly behind the invaders. Through intermediaries
he was introduced to members of the government of General Francisco Franco of Spain. After
meeting with members of Franco’s government, Martínez had secured a group of transport ships
to use as a possible invasion fleet in exchange for preferential trade agreements with Cuba in the
201

Alejandro de la Cruz, A Child in Exile, Rafael Martínez Pupo Papers (Gainesville, University of Florida: Lulu
Publishing, 2011), p. 96-99.

81

event that the second invasion was a success.202 It is at this point in the planning process that the
second invasion that Martínez envisioned became quite complicated. Any second invasion would
have needed a well-trained and disciplined strike force and, to avoid making the same mistakes
that had been made during the Bay of Pigs invasion, the troops need to be trained not to expect a
nation-wide uprising to support them. Martínez turned to members of the French Foreign Legion.
The French had just lost control of Algeria, and France was now flooded with angry
former colonial citizens and members of the military. The most right-wing of the French
military, particularly in the Foreign Legion, made their way to Spain to resettle. Therefore, the
government of Spain could not only provide the Cuban counter-revolutionaries with ships but
also with contacts to a very well-trained, very anti-communist group of solders for hire.203 As
far-fetched as this plan seemed, Martínez still devoted himself to it even while the Commandos
were in action. According to him, he had secured the support of both Franco and a large body of
former Foreign Legionnaires that would be supplemented by the Comandos Mambíses and,
Martínez hoped, U.S. support.204 He believed that this combination would finally be a successful
military answer to the Cuban Revolution since clandestine assassination attempts and raids had
borne no fruit. Presumably, Martínez hoped to gain support from the Kennedy White House
because of the administration’s outspoken willingness to remove Castro. In addition, by taking
these plans into his own hands, he was falling perfectly within the guidelines of the autonomous
operational scheme. Events in Dallas, Texas changed all of this.
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A New President and a New Strategy
It is not the aim of this project to open the Pandora’s Box of the Kennedy assassination
and all of its possibilities, but the event itself significantly affected the conduct of the secret war
against Cuba.205 With the assassination of the president on November 11th 1963, and the
beginning of the Lyndon Johnson presidency, there were a number of personnel changes and an
overhaul of the conduct of the war against Cuba. By that November the counter-revolutionary
bands in the Escombray were mostly gone or laying low, and the Commandos’ assaults had been
blunted. In the wake of the Kennedy assassination there was a brief halt in activity while the CIA
and the U.S. government took stock of what had happened. Castro declared his sorrow at the
assassination of Kennedy and called for the politics of murder to end. This must have been a
difficult moment for the counter-revolutionaries since they had little idea of how their struggle
would continue under Johnson. Martínez was in the middle of organizing his massive plans for a
second invasion of Cuba, and within months he was prepared to give the proposal to Johnson.
Martínez wrote Johnson offering his condolences regarding the late president Kennedy, but he
asked that the fight against Cuban communism not end, especially since Kennedy was such a big
part of it. Even with all of the planning taking place, 1963 would prove to be the end of the
Struggle Against Bandits, and the beginning of a new form of antagonism against the Cuban
Revolution.
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In December of 1963 and January of 1964 the clandestine front was relatively quiet.
Martínez finalized his invasion plans but still required U.S. backing for two reasons. One was
financial and political. Martínez needed additional funds to purchase more aircraft to transport
paratroopers and supplies into battle, and he also needed to arrange political recognition for a
newly organized government in exile. In early 1964, Martínez presented Ted Shackley with the
“Rafael Plan,” as he called it. The Johnson Administration and the CIA were immediately
concerned about the operation. Rafael Martínez did not receive the reaction he was hoping for.206
The Johnson Administration was growing fearful that the autonomous operations were getting
out of hand. This was an inherent contradiction in the entire strategy.207 The U.S. government
had wanted to maintain plausible deniability and not risk using U.S. combat forces so, in theory,
having the Cuban counter-revolutionaries work on their own would have been just the sort of
operation the CIA was looking for. On the other hand, the U.S. government also did not want to
be dragged into an open conflict at the behest of a small group of people in Miami if the
operation failed. Johnson was more concerned at this point with Southeast Asia where in
battleground nations the United States could still influence the outcomes. Cuba’s revolution was
consolidated, and rather than continue to pour resources into removing it, the Johnson
Administration began to gear its strategy towards containing it. On April 7th 1964, the CIA
officially ceased Operation Mongoose and almost all clandestine activity in Cuba. Organizations
like the Comandos Mambíses had their funding cut and were disbanded.208
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Though hostility toward Cuba on the part of the U.S. government did not disappear, its
focus was now placed on “preventing other Cubas” across Latin America and the developing
world.209 The struggle between the Cuban Revolution and U.S. foreign policy continued through
the U.S.’s internationalization of the trade embargo against Cuba and the pressure it placed on
other national liberation movements and Cuba’s material and ideological support for
revolutionary movements across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But what eventually happened
to the counter-revolutionaries? Some, like Rafael Martínez, went back to their businesses or
started new ones in the United States. Others used their anti-communist credentials to rise to
prominence in U.S. politics. The Miami lobby against the Cuban Revolution remains a powerful
political force during election years. There were others who continued their activities without
direct U.S. support. Many who had been well-placed operatives in the 1959-1963 period carried
out acts of terrorism within the United States against moderate voices in the émigré community,
and others remained in the service of the CIA around the world, or as advisors and operatives for
other national security regimes in Latin America.210 The latter group would be brought back into
the spotlight of political prominence on the eve of the of Ronald Reagan’s ascension to the White
House. In that environment, in the wake of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, reactionaries
found willing backers in a renewed effort against the Cuban Revolution.211
The Struggle Against Bandits is a chapter of Cuba’s history marked by the victory of
ordinary Cubans who turned out time and again to prevent the destruction of their revolution. It
was a remarkable feat given that time and again the counter-revolution and its CIA backers were
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forced to reevaluate their strategy. Cuba’s resistance to these efforts had far-reaching
implications for U.S. policy makers and for the CIA’s operatives themselves. In this sense, the
example that Cuba’s resistance against the counter-revolution set for developing nations had a
geopolitical influence that far exceeded the island nation’s small size.
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Conclusion: The Balance Sheet of Siege

Not a Cliché: Popular Organization and Resistance
After analyzing clandestine struggle between the counter-revolutionary movement,
bolstered by the CIA on the one hand and the Cuban Revolution with its very newly formed
intelligence and security services on the other, there are a few very important and very specific
conclusions and observations that can be reached regarding what is lacking in the overall
scholarship on this period. The first and foremost is that Cuba’s revolutionary intelligence
services, organized between 1959 and 1960, were among the youngest and most un-tested
national intelligence apparatuses in the world and have been continually successful in defending
the revolutionary state. Cuba’s revolutionary movement, after having waged an armed struggle
and overthrowing the previous government, was almost immediately subject to attack. What is
seldom described in the mainstream historiography is the fact that upon the initiation of
hostilities on the part of the U.S. government and the counter-revolution, Cuban intelligence was
forced to begin a crash program of organization and defensive preparations in the military,
intelligence, and civilian spheres.212
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Rather than being made up of seasoned spies and operatives, the Cuban intelligence
services were comprised of mostly very young revolutionary volunteers. Many of these cadre
had not taken part in the guerrilla struggle or the student underground but saw themselves as
having a role in the consolidation and, more importantly, the defense of their newly won
revolution. What separated the members of Cuba’s intelligence services from so many around
the world was that they incorporated the public. Unlike like the CIA or the KGB, the Cuban
forces filled their ranks from the many mass-organizations that were forming in the period
immediately following the rebels’ seizure of power. In response to the CIA’s attempts on the life
of the revolutionary leadership as well as the counter-revolution’s constant harassment of the
Cuban economy and social programs, the country’s leadership called for the mobilization of all
sectors of society in order to defend the nascent revolution. The CDRs were organized in
response to the continued airstrikes from unmarked planes launched from Miami, the burning of
department stores and cane fields, and the murder of agricultural workers and teachers in the
rural areas of the country. Rather than frighten the public as they were meant to, in response to
the attacks hundreds of thousands of people on that tiny island turned out to join the CDRs.213
Within two years, there were CDRs in almost every neighborhood of Havana, and by the
end of the decade of the 1960s they were in every municipality of Cuba. The majority of the
intelligence gathered by Cuban security services was provided by CDRs.214 CDRs provided a
defensive role for the public to play. Rather than claim to protect and defend Cuba on behalf of
the public, Cuba’s leadership called on citizens to join CDRs and organizations like them so that
intelligence was able to mobilize as quickly as it did independently. The key to this was the broad mass of
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they could take part in their own defense. This was a monumental boost to the morale of the
revolution’s supporters. Rather than simply living through events, citizens could effect change
and move events along through their participation. This is rarely discussed in the
historiographical literature surrounding this period, and when it is, it is normally dismissed as
political cliché.215 For people in the middle of a great revolutionary moment, it is not a cliché to
desire a role in the defense of that process. In the cases of the U.S. and its allies, these events are
viewed through the lens of Fidel Castro as the “maximum leader” of the revolution, but it is vital
to look beyond that because although the leadership was and certainly remains the face of the
revolution abroad, it is the Cuban public that filled the literal and political trenches in response to
the activities of the counter-revolution. Members of the CDRs reported suspicious activity,
monitored strange vehicles coming and going from work places, and organized neighborhood
watches. They would meet to discuss political issues and make sure that information was readily
available to the local population. In all of the thwarted attempts on Castro’s life as well as the
rooting out of counter-revolutionary cells in Cuba’s cities and towns, most of the intelligence
was gathered simply by concerned citizens in CDRs and through the general observation of the
countryside by those who lived there.
Along with the CDRs, the National Revolutionary Militias were also vital in the defense
of the Cuban Revolution. The MNRs were largely responsible for the battlefield defeat of both
the invasion of Playa Gíron and the counter-revolutionary bands in the Escombary Mountains.
The militias were an all-volunteer force that trained and armed members of the population and
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mobilized them for national defense.216 The militias provided a much needed fighting force since
the Rebel Army, from 1959 through to the mid-1960s, was in a process of retooling and
rearming.217 By the late 1960s, the Rebel Army had officially become the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Cuba (FAR), a uniformed military receiving weapons from the Soviet bloc. Though it
retained its roots as a guerrilla force, the FAR was being trained by Soviet advisors in
conventional warfare. It was during this difficult process that so many of these counterrevolutionary assaults were launched. Though the FAR was by no means absent from the field of
battle, most of the country’s defense fell to the militias. The militias maintained units in
factories, on university campuses, and on communal farmlands. Recruits were trained on certain
days and worked at their regular occupations on others, with periodic long marches and
exercises. Maintaining a committed force of armed citizens supporting the restructuring of
society proved to be a matter of life and death for the Cuban revolution as both invasion and
armed assault were defeated by militia columns. These volunteer mass organizations have been
the sustaining defensive arm of the Cuban revolution through some of its most difficult
periods.218 It was these sorts of participatory organizations, especially the armed militias, that the
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Cuban revolutionary leadership constantly advised fraternal revolutionary movements across
Latin America to adopt for their own defense.219
In the final analysis, along with the Federation of Cuban Women, the National Trade
Unions, and the Union of Small Farmers, all of which were part of the wider revolutionary
reforms taking place, the most important defense assets the Cuban Revolution possessed against
the clandestine efforts to derail it were its people. It is not the aim of this study to minimize the
role of the committed leadership of the Cuban revolution, but too often the leadership is viewed
as the totality of the revolutionary process. The defeat of the counter-revolution succeeded
because ordinary Cubans in their hundreds of thousands refused to go backwards in time.
Though seemingly a simple observation, it is missing from most of the scholarship. It is a
remarkable feat that an intelligence community made up of very young men and women with no
experience and supported by ordinary citizens was able to counter the efforts of the CIA, one of,
if not the, most powerful intelligence service on the planet. Likewise, an armed counterrevolution bolstered by the most powerful military on the planet was defeated in its efforts by
hastily trained militia forces, all within the span of five years. That is really quite remarkable.
Ordinary Cubans should once again be at the head of this narrative.
A testament to the importance of the mass organizations discussed in this project can be
found in their longevity and continued relevance. The CDRs, MNRs, Federation of Cuban
Women, and the Central Trade Union all continue to play a vital role in the everyday functioning
of Cuban political society. In 2013, the CDRs celebrated their 8th Congress where hundreds of
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thousands of local representatives from the committees traveled to Havana to participate in the
massive rally and congressional seminars that would lay out the tasks and strategies for the
committees in the coming years. Though the Cold War is over and the focus of the CDRs is now
more diverse than defending against counter-revolution, the committees still hold national
defense as their highest priority. Today the CDRs retain a great deal of responsibility. They are
in charge of neighborhood watch, repair, and waste disposal, and they serve as a public forum for
debate. The CDRs work closely with the Federation of University Students, The Union of
Young Communists (formed in 1965), and the Central Trade Union to promote healthy living,
anti-sexism, anti-racism and, more recently, anti-homophobia along with participation in the
political process.220
Despite many detractors who dismiss the CDRs and the Cuban political structure in
general as anti-democratic, the CDRs help to foster widespread participation in the Congresses of
People’s Power, the local administrative apparatus, and its elections.221 According to many
academics within Cuban society, the Revolution could not stand without the CDRs in their
current rolls within society. They are in fact a vital part of Cuba’s (often prematurely dismissed
or denied) civil society.222
The National Revolutionary Militias are still an important part of Cuban society. In
November of 2013, Cuba underwent a massive nationwide military exercise, “Bastion 2013.”
Every few years, the country stages military maneuvers that incorporate the whole of society.
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Students, farmers, and workers are mobilized and trained in national defense, including combat
matters, debris clean-up, evacuation, and logistics. The militias are mobilized along with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces and dispersed to various points of the island in defense against a
mock invasion. The militias are in charge of secret weapons caches, the arms from which are to
be distributed to other militia units and trained members of the population to defend their
neighborhoods.223 Though an outright U.S. invasion is now unlikely, these military exercises are
highly organized and an example of how militias and national defense remain very much a part
of Cuban reality. This national defense system was born out of the 1959-1963 period and the
clandestine Struggle Against Bandits. The resistance of the Cuban public through these various
organizations in defense of the gains of their revolution is etched into popular memory on the
island, and that history motivates the conduct of political policy on the island today.
The Forced Change in Policy: Effects and Implications
The second main point of this analysis involves the effects that the resistance of the
majority of the Cuban populace against the counter-revolution has had on U.S. government and
counter-revolutionary policy and tactics. We will look at these two faces of counter-revolution
one at a time. The U.S. policy towards Cuba in all of its manifestations are part and parcel of a
very long history dating back to the earliest years of following the birth of the United States,
during the Spanish colonial period in Cuba. The islands of the Caribbean, and Cuba in particular,
were not just viewed as possible acquisitions by early U.S. policy makers, but as natural
possessions. American leaders, regardless of mainstream party affiliation, have seemingly been
obsessed with possessing Cuba. It was John Quincy Adams who first promoted what was called
the “Ripe Fruit Theory” based on the idea that the islands of the Caribbean would naturally
223
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gravitate toward the United States rather than Spain and would fall naturally into the hands of the
U.S. government. Since that time, American leaders have, to greater or lesser degrees, viewed
Cuba through this lens, in most cases overlooking the political aspirations and aims of the
Cubans themselves.
Over the years, as historian Luis Pérez points out, Cuba became a microcosm of
American imperialism in general.224 In his book, Cuba in the American Imagination, he points
out that within the history of Cuba’s relationship to the United States we see the long list of
foreign policy maneuvers of every strategic stripe, including many that would look familiar to
anyone now living in the twenty first century.225According to Pérez, what truly separates Cuba
from cases of U.S. foreign relations with other states, and revolutionary states in particular, is
that Cuba from early on found its way into American popular and political consciousness. Today
Cuba is one country that most Americans lack knowledge of but at the same time have
passionate opinions about. Early on, Americans created a self-image that, combined with their
ideas of what it meant to be a “nation,” came to define and continue to define how they relate to
other states. This made the creation of a foreign nation-state with different political and
economic programs not only naturally antagonistic, but subject to paternalistic treatment.226
That paternalistic foreign policy had its heyday in the long period between 1898 and the
triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In the months leading up to the declaration of war
against Spain by the United States in 1898, Cuba was portrayed as a beautiful damsel in distress
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in the American media.227 That metaphorical damsel required saving from the Spanish monarchy
in order to establish “freedom” on the island. After thirty years of prolonged and bloody
insurgent warfare on the part of Cuban independence fighters against the Spanish, and after those
same rebels were left out of the peace negotiations, the U.S. imposed military rule over Cuba to
“oversee its transition to democracy.”228 Any resistance on the part of independence fighters on
the island was crushed. At this point, rather than being depicted as a damsel in distress, Cuba was
now portrayed as a racialized child needing to be saved from itself.229 After the triumph of the
revolution, Cuba was given the form of a bearded maniac, and a threatening outlaw that had to
be dealt with. In essence, American perceptions, and therefore political and strategic relations
with Cuba, were and continue to be marked by “yellow journalism.” Today, portrayals of Cuba
in the U.S. media and by the Cuban émigré community depict Cuba as a giant prison rather than
the damsel, the child, or the land of the bearded maniac. This represents an ingrained cultural
aspect of the antagonistic, historical relationship Americans, both in government and private
citizens, have with Cuba, helping to further the efforts of American leaders to derail the Cuban
Revolution and struggle against it clandestinely. American leaders viewed Cuba as something to
be exploited before 1959, and, after 1959, as something that had to be destroyed politically and
militarily. These images were transferred to and accepted by much of the general populace.
Though succeeding on the media front in many ways (Cuba is still misunderstood by many
Americans), the media and American policy makers were unsuccessful in ending the Cuban
Revolution.
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The U.S. government’s efforts to derail the Cuban Revolution remain a political and
ideological frustration for both of the major political parties. Before the Cuban Revolution, the
CIA had experienced success after success in its removal of revolutionary, and even moderate,
movements from power in a number of countries around the world. Cuba was expected to be no
different, especially when its recent past was taken into account (Washington had been selecting
Cuba’s presidents). On the surface, the conflict between the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations and the Cuban Revolution have been viewed as a Cold War issue, a conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union with Cuba as a proxy.230 Cuba was never a
proxy. Cold War antagonisms between the two superpowers, though certainly an aspect of the
Cuban-U.S. conflict, are not the totality of the situation. At the point of the Cuban Revolutionary
reforms, the financial interests of well-placed American and Cuban conglomerates were being
affected, and the example to the rest of the Americas of Cuba removing Wall Street’s financial
dominance terrified policy makers in Washington.231 By late 1960, a new stage of the conflict
began that would have implications for the rest of the Americas. Cuba began to pose a threat to
U.S. hegemony over the Caribbean basin as more and more liberation movements looked to the
Cubans as a model for their own political and economic independence.
The image and example of a tiny island nation with young leaders backed by popular
mass organizations proved to be a great inspiration to millions of people, including communities
of marginalized people within the United States itself. This combination proved too much for the
leadership in Washington, and, from their perspective, Cuba’s revolution could not be allowed to
stand. Conveniently, the U.S. intelligence community could pull willing recruits from a growing
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body of Cuban émigrés moving to the United States and Central America. The shift to
clandestine activity was almost seamless as all of the traditional bastions of American power that
were typically present in Latin American states, and that would have allowed the U.S.
government to assert itself, were gone from Cuba. Washington’s military mission to Cuba was
forced out in 1959, and the embassy was removed in 1961.232 However, all of the U.S.
government’s attempts to form organizations to harass the Cuban economy and to invade Cuba
failed, forcing a change in U.S. policy. The international wave of liberation movements across
the Third World was accelerating, and U.S. strategic policy had to change accordingly.
Following the assassination of President John Kennedy in November of 1963, the Johnson
Administration shifted strategies. Though hostility toward Cuba remained, Johnson’s
administration cut the financial umbilical cord from Washington and Langley to most of the
counter-revolution. A select group of well-placed and experienced operatives remained on the
CIA payroll, but most of the organizations found themselves with no funding and little or no
logistical support. That support would not return until the years of the Reagan Administration
and what Morris Morley calls the “return of vendetta politics toward Cuba.”233
The Counter-Revolution: Defeat and Persistence
The little-known case of the Comandos Mambíses is exemplary of this shift. Though
successful in a number of their hit and run attacks, they were seen by the Johnson Administration
as too little and too late to remove the Cuban Revolution, and many policy makers in
Washington saw them as getting out of control and responded by rejecting the so-called Rafael
Plan for a second invasion of Cuba. Following the cutting of funding to the complex web of
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organizations like the Commandos, U.S. policy shifted to containment rather than outright
invasion or continuous assassination attempts. It was the example of Cuba that had to be
contained. The Johnson Administration was preparing to expand the U.S. intervention into
Southeast Asia, which would turn world attention away from Cuba. Examples of “preventing
other Cubas” can be seen throughout Latin America. The U.S. invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965 was the first in a long line of preemptive and “preventative interventions” in
Latin America meant to blunt Cuba’s example and the support Cuba was providing to Latin
American revolutionaries. Venezuela experienced CIA activity throughout the 1960s as did
Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and eventually Argentina in the 1970s. Grenada was invaded in 1983 in
an effort to prevent revolutionaries from establishing themselves there, not to mention
Washington’s role in the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The right-wing
military governments that controlled most nations in Latin America in this period were supported
by Washington for their suppression of revolution, the left, and even moderates and apolitical
bystanders. Even beyond the Cold War there has been a new wave of U.S. involvement in the
domestic politics of Latin American nations. Washington’s efforts to harass the Bolivarian
government in Venezuela continue to manifest this same style of political intervention and
vendetta politics.
Cuban émigré operatives were involved in most of these reactionary activities indicating
the level of direct or indirect involvement in most of them. Even in Africa and Asia, from
Vietnam to Angola, Cuban émigré operatives of the CIA undertook armed action against national
liberation movements at the CIA’s behest.234 While efforts against the Cuban Revolution did not
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completely halt, resources were shifted elsewhere to counter other liberation movements. This
shift in strategy was a direct result of the effective resistance of Cuba’s public and their support
of their own intelligence community.
In regards to counter-revolutionary organizations like the Commandos, the conclusion as
to why they were continuously unsuccessful in their final aim of removing the Cuban Revolution
is one of legitimacy. In many classrooms, the historical narrative is one of a series of military
miscalculations and sheer bad luck. However, the complex web of émigré organizations lacked
political legitimacy on the island and suffered from the lack of a unified political vision for
Cuba. Though sold to the public of the United States through the media as bands of anticommunist democrats, most of the émigré operatives were seen in Cuba as political gangsters of
the old dictatorial order, or as those who sought to turn back the social, political, and economic
clock to the pre-1959 era. The tactics utilized by the counter-revolution did not endear them to
the Cuban public either. Every time they assassinated a teacher, that was someone’s daughter or
son who was working to bring literacy to the countryside. Every time a field, factory, or shop
was bombed or burned, that was someone’s job that was lost. These efforts were not viewed as
attacks just against a government, but against the community. It seems that counterrevolutionaries never lost their view of themselves as crusaders, which caused a disconnect
between themselves and those for whom they claimed to fight.
The clandestine struggle in this period remains fresh in the minds of the many counterrevolutionaries within the émigré community. Despite their age, prominent members of these
groups still operate within Miami and are a cause celebré within conservative circles. They
remain bitter about their defeat by the Cuban Revolution and also about what they view as their
being sold out by multiple presidential administrations. They were funded and trained by the
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CIA and then, from their perspective, they were pushed to the periphery without being given a
chance to succeed. The darkest side of the clandestine struggle is certainly the legacy of
terrorism that continues into the present. What occurred to the metaphorical counterrevolutionary animal formed during the 1959-1963 period was that, although it was defunded, it
nevertheless remained to bite the hands of both its enemies and its former benefactors. Through
the 1970s and 1980s there were strings of bombings in Miami and New York as well as a
continued arming of organizations like Alpha 66 and Omega 7. Though not directly under the
orders of the CIA, these organizations were made up of veterans of the original clandestine
struggle, and through the finances they were able to save and raise from the angry Miami
community, they were able to continue their activities with almost total impunity. Quite simply,
the leaders of these organizations, although they frustrated many U.S. policy makers with their
activities, knew too much to be “reined in.”235
Luís Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch rank among the counter-revolution’s most
notorious terrorists. Carriles, a former policeman under Batista and a CIA operative in the 19601963 period, was involved with acts of terrorism against Cuba from bases in Central and South
America for decades. He was most recently responsible for a string of hotel bombings in Havana
in the 1990s in efforts to frighten foreigners away from the island.236 Orlando Bosch, a very
outspoken anti-Castro militant, was involved in a number of bombings of radio stations and
attempts on the lives of journalists in Miami who advocated dialogue between the United States
and Cuba. Bosch, along with Carriles, was involved in what became the worst terrorist attack
against Cuba to date, which was the 1976 bombing of Cubana Airlines flight 455 from Barbados,
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killing everyone aboard including the entire Cuban Olympic fencing team. 237 When questioned
about the bombing, Bosch replied simply that he “slept like a baby and that those killed on the
airline were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time.”238 He was eventually awarded
certificates of honor from the University of Miami. This bitterness and violence are the aftereffects of the formation of a complex and well-armed counter-revolution that was eventually
pushed to the periphery by Washington only to be turned to periodically to deploy around the
world to quell revolutionary movements. In exchange for these services, Washington often
turned a blind eye to the counter-revolutionaries’ terrorist activities activities, which included
everything from assassination attempts on the lives of Cuban diplomats to the U.N., to the car
bombing in Washington D.C. that killed Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. In effect, as the
Cuban Revolution attempted to globalize its struggle through its example and aid to
revolutionary and national liberation movements the world over, the counter-revolution
attempted to globalize its activities as well. Omega 7 and Alpha 66 take on a more radical course
of action than the Comandos Mambíses, but they are both the political and military grandchildren
of the “Bandits.”
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Appendix A
Major Acts of Terrorism against Cuba During the Struggle Against Bandits, 1959-1963























June 7, 1959- Cuban Embassies in Haiti and the Dominican Republic are attacked by
counterrevolutionaries.
June 10, 1959- Car of Cuban ambassador to the Dominican Republic riddled with bullets
in an attack carried out by former Batista officers.
July 4, 1959- Cuban consul in Miami is attacked by Batista supporters.
July 14, 1959- Cuban cargo plane hijacked by counterrevolutionary operatives.
August 1959- Former Batista military officers along with operatives of the CIA and
intelligence operatives of Rafael Trujillo attempt an assault on Cuba which is suppressed.
October 21, 1959- Unmarked planes strafe downtown Havana and western Cuba.
October 22, 1959- Civilian passenger train in Las Villas is machine-gunned by counterrevolutionaries in an unmarked plane.
January 1960- Month-long string of cane field burnings and factory sabotages by
counterrevolutionary bands in efforts to cripple the Cuban economy. Two
counterrevolutionary planes are shot down. Two U.S. pilots are captured.
January 12, 1960- Counterrevolutionary napalm attacks on Cuban sugar cane fields in
Havana province.
January 20, 1960- More cane bombings in Las Villas.
January 28, March 2, 1960- More than five recorded aerial bombardments from
unmarked planes on Cuban factories and farms with napalm and white phosphorus.
March 4, 1960- Explosion of La Coubre causes more than 100 deaths and over 200
wounded.
March 9, 1960- Reporter for Revolucíon newspaper is attacked in an assassination
attempt in Miami.
April 9, 1960- Counterrevolutionary band in the Escombry murder a peasant.
May 7, 1960- Havana offices of La Calle newspaper are bombed.
May 31, 1960- Revolutionary newspaper office attacked in a drive by shooting by
counterrevolutionary band.
August 16, 1960- First attempt on the life of Fidel Castro.
August 24, 1960- Unmarked boats shell Miramar neighborhood in Havana.
December 26, 1960- Counterrevolutionaries set fire to Havana department store.
January 5, 1961- Teenage literacy brigade member Conrado Benitez is murdered by
counter-revolutionary band.
February 22, 1961- Literacy worker Pedro Morejón murdered by counterrevolutionaries.
March 12, 1961- Oil refineries in Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas are bombed by
counterrevolutionaries.
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April 13, 1961- El Encanto department store is firebombed resulting in the death of Fe de
Valle.
April 15, 1961- Airstrikes by aircraft painted with Cuba insignia against Cuban airports
and airfields resulting in civilian deaths.
April 17-19, 1961- The Invasion of Playa Girón.
May 7, 1961- Cuban Navy ship sunk by counterrevolutionaries aboard a fast moving
attack boat.sixteen Cuban sailors are killed.
May 28, 1961- Cuban cinema in Pinar del Rio is attacked leading to twenty six children
and fourteen adults are wounded.
July 4, 1961- Counterrevolutionaries hijack a Cubana airliner and murder the guard.
November 26, 1961- Literacy worker Manuel Ascunce is tortured and murdered along
with local farmer by counterrevolutionary band.
January 1, 1962- counterrevolutionary attack on the port of Carraguao.
January 22, 1962- Counterrevolutionary agents attack small town east of Baracoa.
February 10, 1962- Unmarked plane bombs Havana.
February 21, 1962- Counterrevolutionaries attack a school in Las Villas
April 27, 1962- Fifty workers injured in sabotage on chemical refinery by
counterrevolutionaries.
May 12, 1962- Alpha 66 attacks Cuban ship killing crewmembers.
June- July 1962- String of commando raids against hospitals and militia training centers.
September 1962- String of bombings perpetrated by Alpha 66.
November 1960-October 1962- 14,000 children are removed from their parents after a
lengthy propaganda campaign enacted by the CIA and the Catholic Church codenamed
Operation Peter Pan.
November 1962- January 1963- Counterrevolutionaries attack a series of mobile cinemas
meant to bring films to rural Cuba.
April-September 1963- String of attacks by Comandos Mambises against Cuban coastal
targets.
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Appendix B
Legacies: Major Acts of Terrorism against Cuba, 1964-2012










December 11, 1964- Attempt on the life of Che Guevara in a bazooka attack on the U.N.
building in New York.
October 12, 1971- Counterrevolutionaries land at small town of Boca de Sama, and
killing and wounding numerous innocent civilians.
September 9, 1973- Omega 7 bombs Cuba’s U.N mission in New York. Additional bomb
attacks in October and November.
October 4 1973- Fishing boat attacked by counterrevolutionaries resulting in the death of
the crew.
October 6 1976- Cubana flight 455 bombed returning from Barbados, killing all 73
passengers.
Sept 21, 1976- Five Cuban counter-revolutionaries (later indicted) assassinate Chilean
ex-diplomat Orlando Letelier and assistant Ronni Moffitt.
October 1981- Biological attack on Cuba resulting in 158 deaths from introduced dengue
fever.
April- September 1997- Counter-revolutionary bombing campaign in Havana and
Varadero causing hundreds of wounded and the death of one Italian tourist.
April 27, 2012- Travel agency promoting travel and interchange between Americans and
Cuba is firebombed. Investigation is ongoing.

*All dates are listed in the Chronology Sections of Fabian Escalante’s trilogy on CIA operations
in Cuba.
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